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In Delgamuukiv v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court
of Canada issued its long-awaited judgment on the
status of Aboriginal title under section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The decision was regarded as
highly significant because it seemed to fundamentally
alter the law of Aboriginal rights. This article suggests
that while the case has somewhat positively changed the
law to protect Aboriginal title, it has also
simultaneously sustained a legal framework that
undermines Aboriginal land rights. In particular, the
decision's unreflective acceptance of Crown sovereignty
places Aboriginal title in a subordinate position relative
to other legal rights. This article examines how this
result defeats the Court's own requirements for a just
settlement with Aboriginal peoples. This review
proceeds through exploring the Supreme Court's
treatment of Aboriginal pleadings, evidence, content
and proof of title, Aboriginal self-government, and the
extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the Delgamuukw
case. In investigating these issues, this article concludes
by illustrating how a more rigorous application of the
rule of law to the Crown in its dealings with Aboriginal
peoples could generate greater equality and justice for
Aboriginal peoples in their relations with the Canadian
state.
Dans Delgamuuk;v c. Colombie-Britannique, la Cour
Supr6me du Canada a 6mis sonjugement, longuement
attendu, sur le statut du titre des Aborigbnes dans la
section 35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. La
d6ecision a 6t6 pergue comme 6tant hautement
significative parce qu'elle semblait changer
fondamentalement la loi sur les droits des Aborigines.
Cet article sugg~re que la d6cision ait en quelque sorte
positivement chang6 la loi pour prot6ger le titre des
Aborigines, tandis qu'il a aussi maintenu en mgme
temps un cadre 16gal qui mine les droits territoriaux des
Aborignes. L'acceptation irr~fl6chie de la d6ecision de
la souverainet6 de la Couronne, place le titre des
Aborigines dans une position subordonn6e par rapport
aux autres droits 16gaux. Cet article examine comment
ce rdsultat d6fait les propresexigences de Ia Cour pour
un raglement 6quitable avec les Aborigines. Cet
examen proc~de A explorer la fagon dont la Cour
Supr6me traite les affaires Aborigines, les preuves, le
contenu et la preuve de titre, le gouvernement des
Aborigines, et l'an6antissement du titre des
Aborigines dans Ia d6cision de Delgamuukw. En
examinant ces questions, cet article tire des conclusions
en illustrant comment une application plus rigoureuse
de la force de la loi A 1'gard de la Couronne dans son
traitement avec les Aborigines pourrait engendrer une
6galit plus grande et une justice pour les Aborigines
dans leur rapport avec 1'6tat canadien.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,1 the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples' 2 claim to
Aboriginal title and self-government over approximately 58,000 square
kilometres of land in (what is now called) northwestern British
Columbia.3 Both nations have lived in this area as "distinct people" for a
"long, long time prior to [British assertions of] sovereignty." 4 For
millennia, their histories have recorded their organization into Houses
and Clans in which hereditary chiefs have been responsible for the
allocation, administration, and control of traditional lands.5 Within these
1 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafterDelgamuukv (S.C.C.)].
2 The Wet'suwet'en are an Athabaskan-speaking people, and the Gitksan are associated with
the Tsimshian language group. Their territories are located in or near village sites on the Skeena,
Babine, and Bulkley Rivers: see Gisday Wa & Delgamuukw, The Spirit in the Land (Gabriola, B.C.:
Reflections, 1989) at 1-20 [hereinafter Spirit in the Land].
3 See A. Jeffrey, "Remove Not the Landmark" in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British
Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books & The Institute for
Research on Public Policy, 1992) 58 at 61, where the hereditary chief summarized their action as
follows: "The Gitksan people feel we have absolute title and ownership to our land."
4 Delgamuukv v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 at 278 (B.C. S.C.), McEachern
C.J. [hereinafter Delgamuukv (B.C. S.C.)].
5 For a description of these histories, see Delgamuukv (S.C.C.),supra note 1 at 1071-72:
The adaawk and kungax of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en nations, respectively, are oral
histories of a special kind. They were described by the trial judge ... as a "sacred 'official'
litany, or history, or recital of the most important laws, history, traditions and traditional
territory of a House." The content of these special oral histories includes its physical
representation totem poles, crests and blankets. The importance of the adaawk and
kungax is underlined by the fact that they are "repeated, performed and authenticated at
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Houses, chiefs pass on important histories, songs, crests, lands, ranks,
and properties from one generation to the next.6 The passage of these
legal, political, social, and economic entitlements is performed and
witnessed through Feasts. These Feasts substantiate the territories'
relationships. 7 A hosting House serves food, distributes gifts, announces
the House's successors to the names of deceased chiefs, describes the
territory, raises totem poles, and tells the oral history of the House.
Chiefs from other Houses witness the actions of the Feast, and at the
end of the proceedings they validate the decisions and declarations of
the Host House. As such, the Feast is an important "institution through
which the people [have] governed themselves,"8 and it confirms the
relationship between each House and its territories.9 As observed by the
trial judge, McEachern C.J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court:
The spiritual connection of Houses with their territory is most noticeably maintained in
the feast hall, where, by telling and re-telling their stories, and by identifying their
territories, and by providing food or other contributions to the feast from their territories,
they remind themselves over and over again of the sacred connection that they have with
their lands.10
important feasts." ... At those feasts, dissenters have the opportunity to object if they
question any detail and, in this way, help ensure the authenticity of the adaawk and
kungax. Although they serve largely the same role, the trial judge found that there are
some differences in both the form and content of the adaawk and the kungax. For
example, the latter is "in the nature of a song ... which is intended to represent the
special authority and responsibilities of a chief ...." However, these differences are not
legally relevant for the purposes of the issue at hand. It is apparent that the adaawk and
kungax are of integral importance to the distinctive cultures of the appellant nations. At
trial, they were relied on for two distinct purposes. First, the adaawk was relied on as a
component of and, therefore, as proof of the existence of a system of land tenure law
internal to the Gitksan, which covered the whole territory claimed by that appellant. In
other words, it was offered as evidence of the Gitksan's historical use and occupation of
that territory. For the Wet'suwet'en, the kungax was offered as proof of the central
significance of the claimed lands to their distinctive culture.
6 See A. Mills, Eagle Down is Our Law: Witsuvit'en Law, Feasts, and Land Claims (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1994).
7 The point about territories having relationships can be explained by reference to the world
view of Aboriginal peoples, as evidenced in the structure of Aboriginal languages. For example, in
Ojibway, and many other Aboriginal languages, there is no division on the basis of gender, as in
French. Rather, the division is along animate/inanimate lines. If one speaks an Aboriginal language,
he or she must identify certain things in the world as animate (such as rocks, animals, trees) that are
not considered as such in the English language. Since many things are by their nature animate (and
have agency), they can have relationships. See generally J. Borrows, "Living Between Water and
Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning and Democracy" (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 417.
8 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 at 608 (B.C. C.A.), Lambert
J.A. [hereinafterDelgamuukiv (B.C. C.A.)].
9 Ibid.
10 Delgamuuliv (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 233.
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The first known European to contact the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en peoples was William Brown, a Hudson's Bay Company
trader who established a fort on Lake Babine in 1822. He described
these people as "men of property"11 and possessors of lands who
regulated access to their territory through a "structure of nobles or
chiefs, commoners, kinship arrangements of some kind and priority
relating to the trapping of beaver in the vicinity of the villages."12
Writing in his journal in 1823, Brown observed that the chiefs claimed an
exclusive right to certain tracts of land, and would not allow anyone to
hunt upon them. In this regard, the trial judge in Delgamuukw accepted
the evidence of Arthur Ray, who said:
When the Europeans first reached the middle and upper Skeena River area in the 1820s
they discovered that the local natives were settled in a number of relatively large villages.
The people subsisted largely off their fisheries which, with about two months of work per
year, allowed them to meet most of their food needs. Summer villages were located
beside their fisheries. Large game and fur bearers were hunted on surrounding, and
sometimes, on more distant lands. Hunting territories were held by "nobles" on behalf of
the lineages they represented and these native leaders closely regulated the hunting of
valued species. The various villages were linked into a regional exchange network.
Indigenous commodities and European trade goods circulated within and between
villages by feasting, trading and gambling activities.
13
This piece of evidence, among others, persuaded the trial judge that
Aboriginal people had "been present in parts of the territory, if not from
time immemorial, at least for an uncertain, long time before the
commencement of the historical period." 14
However, despite finding an historic and contemporary
Aboriginal presence in the areas, McEachern C.J., in a much criticized
judgment,IS dismissed the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en's claims to
11 A.J. Ray, "Fur Trade History and the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Comprehensive Claim: Men of
Property and the Exercise of Title" in K. Abel & J. Friesen, eds., Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada:
Historical and LegalAspects (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991) 301 at 303.
12 Delgamuukw (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 281, McEachern C.J.
13 Ibid. at 278-79.
14 Ibid. at 281.
15 See D. Culhane, The Pleasure of the Crown (Burnaby, B.C.: Talon Books, 1998); D. Monet
& A. Wilson, Colonialism on Trial: Indigenous Land Rights and the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
Sovereignty Case (Philadelphia: New Society, 1992); L.H. Pinder, The Qarriers of No: After the Land
Claims Trial (Vancouver: Lazara Press, 1991); Cassidy, ed., supra note 3; M. Asch & C. Bell,
"Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights Litigation" in M. Asch,
ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect for Difference
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 38; J. Cruickshank, "Invention of Anthropology in British
Columbia's Supreme Court: Oral Tradition and Evidence in Delgamuukw v. B.C." (1992) 95 B.C.
Stud. 25; R. Fisher, "Judging History: Reflections on the Reasons for Judgment in Delgamuukw v.
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ownership and jurisdiction. He held that "aboriginal rights, arising by
operation of law, are non-proprietary rights of occupation for residence
and aboriginal user which are extinguishable at the pleasure of the
Sovereign."16 As such, as Lamer C.J.C. noted, he "was not satisfied that
they owned the territory in its entirety in any sense that would be
recognized by law."17 Chief Justice McEachern's judgment rested upon
the "proposition ... that aboriginal rights are ... dependent upon the
good will of the Sovereign" and "existed at the pleasure of the Crown,
and could be extinguished by unilateral act."18 Consequently, he held
that "aboriginal rights to the land had been extinguished [because] of
certain colonial enactments which demonstrated an intention to manage
Crown lands in a way that was inconsistent with [their continued
existence]."19 In his view, the law "never recognized that the settlement
of new lands depended upon the consent of the Indians."20 He therefore
held that "the Crown with full knowledge of the local situation fully
intended to settle the colony and to grant titles and tenures unburdened
by any aboriginal interests."21 Furthermore, he "rejected the ... claim for
a right of self-government, relying on both the sovereignty of the Crown
at common law, and what he considered to be the relative paucity of
evidence regarding an established governance structure" among the
people.22
B.C." (1992) 95 B.C. Stud. 43; J.R. Fortune, "ConstruingDelgamuuklv: Legal Arguments, Historical
Argumentation, and the Philosophy of History" (1992) 51 U.T. Fac. L Rev. 80; M. Walters, "British
Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuulov v. British
Columbia" (1993) 17 Queen's L.J. 350; and N. Oman, Sharing Horizons: A Paradigm for Political
Accommodation in Intercultural Settings (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1997) [unpublished].
16 Delgamuukv (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 416, McEachern C.J.
17 Delgamuukw (S.C.C),supra note 1 at 1034, Lamer C.J.C.
18 Ibid. at 1033, 1037.
19 Ibid. at 1038.
2 0 Ibid. at 1037.
21 Ibid. at 1038.
22 Ibid. at 1035. In "The Fire Within Us" in Cassidy, ed., supra note 3, 53 at 56, Satsan (Herb
George), former speaker for the Office of the Hereditary Chiefs, wrote: "We view this judgment for
what it is-a denial and a huge misunderstanding and ignorance of the First Nations across this
country. It is a failure to recognize the First Nations of this country for what they are and who they
are-the First Nations of this land, the owners of this land." By relying on assertions of British
sovereignty to diminish and dispossess Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en rights to land, McEachern C.J.
continued a trend imbricated in the very bedrock of western European legal thought. His reasons
for judgment employed ancient discursive practices that recognized prior Aboriginal presence on
the land, but denied this fact any attendant legal protection. Paul Tennant, a leading political
scientist of Aboriginal issues, observed in his article "The Place of Delgamuukw in British Columbia
History and Politics-And Vice Versa" in Cassidy, ed., ibi., 73 at 81-82 [hereinafter "The Place of
Delgamuukw"] that "the major political and historical significance of the Delgamuukv judgment is
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The Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en appealed this decision to the
British Columbia Court of Appeal. In a 3:2 decision, the appellate court
upheld the trial judge's rejection of Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en claims to
ownership and jurisdiction, though it recognized lesser Aboriginal
sustenance rights. In dealing with the claim to ownership, Justice
Macfarlane, writing for the majority, stated: "I think the trial judge
properly applied correct legal principles in his consideration of the
plaintiffs claim to ownership." 23 Thus, the Court of Appeal left
undisturbed McEachern C.J.'s finding that Aboriginal land rights were
non-proprietary in nature and a burden on the Crown's underlying
interest. Furthermore, in upholding the trial judge's decision concerning
jurisdiction,24 Justice Macfarlane wrote:
I think that the trial judge was correct in his view that when the Crown imposed English
law on all the inhabitants of the colony and, in particular, when British Columbia entered
Confederation, the Indians became subject to the legislative authority in Canada ... . The
division of governmental powers between Canada and the provinces left no room for a
third order of government.25
Having failed to persuade the lower courts to recognize
Aboriginal ownership and jurisdiction in their territories, the Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en appealed their case to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In its decision, the Supreme Court did not substantially depart from the
previous courts' reliance on assertions of British sovereignty in
grounding its discussion of Aboriginal title. The Court found that
"Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title."2 6
Furthermore, it did not specifically recognize or affirm Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en ownership or jurisdiction over their territories. Despite
this failure to question underlying Crown title, the Delgamuukw decision
generated a great deal of commentary concerning its perceived "blow to
the legacy of colonialism." 27 This controversy is somewhat perplexing,
given the judgment's conservative foundation; yet both supporters and
critics of Aboriginal rights have argued that this decision shows the
Court's "willingness to make new law and to adapt traditional legal
indeed that it embodies the traditional white views ... based squarely on the cognitive framework
and belief system that underlie and maintain the traditional white views."
2 3 Delganuukv (B.C. C.A.), supra note 8 at 498, Macfarlane J.A.
24 For commentary on the jurisdictional aspect of this judgment, see B. Freedman, "The Space
for Aboriginal Self-Government in British Columbia: The Effect of the Decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 49.
2 5 Delgamuukw (B.C. C.A.), supra note 8 at 520.
2 6 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1098, Lamer C.J.C.
2 7 P. Barnsley, "New Trial Ordered in Delgamuukw Case" Windspeaker (January 1998) 2.
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concepts to changing cultural demands." 28 For example, the Gitksan
chief negotiator Mas Gak (Don Ryan) stated: -
This is a judgment the Gitxsan people have worked towards since the first European
entered our traditional territory over 130 years ago .... In this case the Supreme Court
came down on the side of justice. We are extremely happy for all First Nations people in
B.C., in Canada and around the world.
29
Herb George, speaker for the Wet'suwet'en chiefs and Vice Chief of the
Assembly of First Nations, echoed Ryan's sentiments.30 People within
the communities also seem to see the decision as a "new beginning" that
changes their legal position in relation to Canada.3 ' In a similar vein,
critics of the judgment have expressed their opinion that the Court has
fundamentally altered the law of Aboriginal rights.32 As such, it has been
labelled "a breathtaking mistake"33 that is said to "undermine all Crown
title in the province,"34 and "shows a reckless disregard for public
opinion and popular sovereignty."35 For example, Mel Smith observed:
28 K. Hamilton & G. McKinnon, "Some Evidence No Longer Needs to be 'Literally True'
The Vancouver Sun (18 December 1997) A19.
29 Cited in Barnsley, supra note 27 at 2.
30 Satsan (Herb George) stated the following in J. Aubry, "'Major Victory' on Land Claims"
The [Montreal] Gazette (12 December 1997) Al: "It's a great day for aboriginal people across
Canada. We were given a diamond for Christmas instead of a lump of coal."
31 See L. Grindlay, "Native Bands Rejoice at Top Court's Ruling" The Vancouver Province (12
December 1997) A4; and A. Purvis, "Our Home and Native Land" Time (22 December 1997) 18.
Other Aboriginal people also expressed the opinion that this decision was a fundamental change.
Chief Joe Mathias of the First Nations Summit, an organization representing a majority of First
Nations in British Columbia, expressed his opinion that the decision is a major change, stating in
Barnsley, supra note 27 at 2, that it "restores the rule of law and justice for First Nations."
32 For example, Preston Manning, leader of the official opposition in the House of Commons,
wrote about the Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw in "Parliament, Not Judges, Must Make
the Laws of the Land" The Globe and Mail (16 June 1998) A21:
In that decision the court, after two days of hearings, completely reversed the direction of
a decision by the Supreme Court of British Columbia that was made by that court after
384 trial days and the most exhaustive inquiry into the history and meaning of aboriginal
title ever conducted in that province.
33 G. Gibson, "The Land-Claims Ruling is a Breathtaking Mistake" The Globe and Mail (16
December 1997) A21. -
34 Ibid. Trevor Lautens, in "How to Make Indian Land Claims Go Away" The Vancouver Sun
(28 February 1998) A23, reported that Mel Smith, former constitutional advisor to British Columbia
governments in the 1980s, said that the Court "drastically undermined the Crown ownership of 94
per cent of the land mass of B.C."
35 T. Morely, "A Distant Court, an Imprudent Decision" The Vancouver Sun (20 December
1997) A21.
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In sum, in aboriginal cases we are no longer to be governed by the rule of law grounded
on common law principles ... . True, if certain strict criteria are met, settlement and
resource development can continue to take place in the province but only if
compensation is paid for past as well as future "infringements." What price the City of
Vancouver and every other city, town, village, hamlet and resource tenure in the
province? The court has ignored completely what the assertion of British sovereignty over
the territory in 1846 really means.3 6
A detailed inspection of the judgment makes it clear that commentators
on both sides have misapprehended the depth of the Court's reliance on
assertions of British sovereignty to ground their analysis of Aboriginal
title. If Aboriginal title must be established by reference to "the time at
which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land subject to that
title,"37 as the Supreme Court suggests, it is not easy to see how the
decision departs from its colonial heritage. To examine this conundrum,
a closer reading of the case is in order.
An examination of the case in a way that highlights the
persistence and effects of the Crown's assertion of sovereignty may not
be welcome in contemporary British Columbia for many reasons.
Supporters of Aboriginal title might not find it helpful to have a detailed
analysis of the case point out weaknesses in their advancement of rights,
as Aboriginal organizations and advocates have been trying to change
conventional approaches to land claims by highlighting the more positive
aspects of the judgment. A discussion of the case's deficiencies may fuel
federal and provincial recalcitrance and entrench what some regard as
counterproductive, long-established patterns of dealing with Aboriginal
title. On the other hand, unveiling the judgment's internal
inconsistencies may invite Aboriginal peoples to be more demanding of
their federal and provincial counterparts. A focus on the Court's
continued reliance on non-consensual colonial assertions of Crown
sovereignty may not help apologists for the status quo and those who
pursue objectives that continue to infringe Aboriginal title. Indeed, the
judgment's sustenance of the deep dispossession of Aboriginal peoples
sets Canadian land tenures in British Columbia on a questionable
foundation. Thus, a cataloguing of how Crown sovereignty permeates
the Court's comprehension of Aboriginal title may not find many
supporters. Nevertheless, a full understanding of the judgment requires
that the Court's own words be thoroughly scrutinized. The Court
36 M.H. Smith, Letter to the Editor, The Globe and Mail (7 January 1998) A15. For further
understanding of Smith's perspective, see M.H. Smith, Our Home or Native Land? What
Govemments'Aboriginal Policy is Doing to Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1996).
3 7 Delgamuuakv (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1097 [emphasis omitted].
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identifies section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198238 as having a "noble
purpose,"39 ending Aboriginal injustice suffered "at the hands of [the]
colonizers." 40 This finding must be placed beside the Court's holdings
that simultaneously sanction and permit the colonization of British
Columbia.
II. COLONIAL ORIGINS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Aboriginal peoples were a substantial majority of the population
in the newly formed province of British Columbia when it entered
Confederation in 1871.41 Despite overwhelming numerical strength, they
did not participate in the province's creation. Most Aboriginal peoples
continued to live within their own governments on their lands, as they
had done for centuries, with little regard for British assertions of
sovereignty. In these circumstances, the words of United States Supreme
Court Justice John Marshall are worth recalling:
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or
over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its
ancient possessors.42
How, then, under such circumstances, did the Aboriginals become
"subject to the legislative authorities in Canada" as the Court of Appeal
indicated?43 Is it because, as McEachern C.J. suggested, they "became a
conquered people, not by force of arms, for that was not necessary, but
by an invading culture and a relentless energy with which they would not,
or could not, compete"? 44 Or did this so-called subjection occur because
38 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
39 R. v. C6tM, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at 174 [hereinafter CMtel.
40 Ibid. at 175.
41 Aboriginal peoples were still in the majority in the province in 1881, ten years after union:
see C. Harris, The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) at 140. There were 26,849 Indians, 4,195 Chinese, and 19,069 settlers
of European origin.
42 Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 at 543 (1832) [hereinafter Worcester].
43 Delgamuuklv (B.C. CA.), supra note 8 at 520.
44 Delgamuuktv (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 342.
1999]
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of historic and continuing assertions of British and Canadian sovereignty
through unjust and discriminatory laws?
In 1872, when Aboriginal peoples outnumbered the settler
population approximately 4:1 in the province,45 and more than 15:1 on
the north coast,46 one of the new province's first legislative acts was to
exclude Indians from voting.47 This same government continued to
uphold previously prejudicial laws that denied Indians fee simple title to
pre-empted lands taken up through settlement, a right freely granted to
non-Aboriginal people in British Columbia.48 Furthermore, this
government did not acknowledge any legal interest of Aboriginal
"peoples over lands they traditionally or contemporaneously used and
occupied. As a result, the province surveyed extremely small and
inadequate reserves for Indians, 49 and it would not recognize any
broader Aboriginal title to land.50 When Aboriginal peoples in British
45 This ratio is projected from Wilson Duff's figures: see W. Duff, The Indian History of British
Columbia: The Impact of the White Man, vol. 1 (Victoria: Provincial Museum of Natural History and
Anthropology, 1964) at 42-45.
46 See Harris, supra note 41 at 138. The proportional representation of Aboriginal to non-
Aboriginal people was even greater in Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en territory prior to Confederation.
There was no land alienation prior to 1871, and while some miners, missionaries, and traders lived
among them in small numbers at this time, it was not until the early 1900s that the first farmers
settled there: see Delgamuuklv (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 343.
47 See An Act to amend "The Qualification and Registration of Voters Amendment Act, 1871,"
1872 (B.C.), 35-38 Vict., No. 39, s. 13.
48 See An Ordinance further to define the law regulating the acquisition of Land in British
Columbia, 1866 (B.C.), 29 Vict., No. 24, s. 1, which provided:
The right conferred ... on British Subjects, or aliens ... of pre-empting and holding in fee
simple unoccupied, and unsurveyed, and unreserved crown lands in British Columbia,
shall not (without the special permission thereto of the Governor first had in writing)
extend to or be deemed to have been conferred on ... any of the Aborigines of this
Colony or the Territories neighbouring thereto.
A further amendment passed by the Legislative Council on 22 April 1870 extended the denial to
"any of the Aborigines of this Continent."
49 See British Columbia, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 1850-1875
(Victoria: Government Printer, 1875) at 42, where Joseph Trutch, a policy advisor to the British
Columbia government between 1864 and 1871, wrote that
[t]he Indians regard these extensive tracts of land as their individual property; but of by
far the greater portion thereof they make no use whatever and are not likely to do so; and
thus the land, much of which is either rich pasture or available for cultivation and greatly
desired for immediate settlement, remains in an unproductive condition-is of no real
value to the Indians and utterly unprofitable to the public interests. I am, therefore, of
the opinion that these reserves should, in almost every case, be very materially reduced.
50 See "Report to the Government of British Columbia on the Subject of Indian Reserves" in
ibid., 1 at 11, where Trutch, in denying Aboriginal title in British Columbia, observed that "the title
of the Indians in the fee of the public lands, or any portion thereof, has never been acknowledged by
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Columbia repeatedly tried to challenge this mistreatment, the province
responded by further diminishing their land rights and their political
rights.5 The federal government eventually followed suit by amending
the Indian Act,52 making it virtually illegal to raise such matters before
the courts.5 3 The exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from democratic
participation in British Columbia through the passage of these corrupt
laws should be a paramount consideration when there are claims that
Aboriginal peoples are subject to Canada's legislative authority.
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
In R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court directed that "the aboriginal
perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake"5 4 must be taken
into account. An important question in this context is whether the
authority of an imposed, obstructionist, and unrepresentative
government should be recognized as legally infringing or extinguishing
any jurisdiction55 that Aboriginal peoples possess. With this approach, is
the assertion of British sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples in British
Government, but, on the contrary, is distinctly denied."
51 See P. Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British
Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) at 96-114 [hereinafter Aboriginal Peoples and
Politics].
52 Section 141 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98 reads:
Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent General expressed in
writing, receives, obtains, solicits or requests from any Indian any payment or
contribution or promise of any payment or contribution for the purpose of raising a fund
or providing money for the prosecution of any claim which the tribe or band of Indians to
which such Indian belongs, or of which he is a member, has or is represented to have for
the recovery of any claim or money for the benefit of the said tribe or band, shall be guilty
of an offence and liable upon summary conviction for each such offence to a penalty ....
53 See B. Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian
Affairs in Canada (Vancouver. UBC Press, 1986) at 59.
54 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1112 [hereinafter Sparrow].
55 See Delgamuukw (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 473, where McEachern C.J. stated:
It is inconceivable, in my view, that another form of government could exist in the colony
after the Crown imposed English law, appointed a Governor with power to legislate, took
title to all the land of the colony and set up procedures to govern it by a Governor and
Legislative Council under the authority of the Crown. In addition, in my view, the
enactment of the British North America Act, 1867, and adherence to it by the colony of
British Columbia in 1871, which was accomplished by Imperial, Canadian and colonial
legislation, confirmed with the establishment of a federal nation with all legislative
powers divided only between Canada and the province. This also clearly and plainly
extinguished any residual aboriginal legislative or other jurisdiction, if any, which might
have existed in the colonial period.
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Columbia, as R. v. Van der Peet asks, a "morally and politically defensible
conception of aboriginal rights"?5 6 Does the decision, as R. v. C6t
cautions, perpetuate "historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples
at the hands of [the] colonizers"?S7 Is Delgamuukw consistent with the
Court's own standard of upholding the "noble and prospective purpose
of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the
Constitution Act, 1982"?58 If assertions of sovereignty operate as they
have throughout western European legal thought, should we wonder, as
the Australian High Court asked in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2],59
whether such an unjust and discriminatory doctrine can continue to be
accepted?
This article questions the Court's unreflecting acceptance of the
Crown's assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples in British
Columbia. It maintains that the Court's assumption of Crown
sovereignty "risks undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by
perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the
hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-
existing aboriginal societies."60 This danger flows from the case despite
its extraordinarily progressive attempt to recognize and facilitate
Indigenous legal pluralism within Canada. Delgamuukw's continuation
of imperialism's legacy in the face of its own language, which promotes
morality and justice, reveals these internal conflicts. Despite its positive
features, there are many ways in which the case's treatment of
sovereignty negatively influences Indigenous peoples' ability to question
the taking of their lands. This article examines these implications to
show that the Court's use of "sovereignty" defines the terrain on which
Aboriginal peoples must operate if they are going to dispute the Crown's
actions in Canadian courts. To illustrate this point, this article analyzes
the Supreme Court's treatment of the following issues in Delgamuukw:
A. Do the pleadings preclude the Court from entertaining claims for aboriginal title'and
self-government?
56 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 547 [hereinafter Van der Peet], citing Walters, supra note 15 at 413.
57 Cti, supra note 39 at 175.
58 1bia-
59 (1992), 175 C.LR. 1 (H.C.A.) [hereinafter Mabo].
6 0 C6t, supra note 39 at 175. To quote the words of Brennan J. in Mabo, supra note 59 at 42:
"Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights and interests
in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of
that kind can no longer be accepted."
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B. What is the ability of this Court to interfere with the factual findings made by the trial
judge?
C. What is the content of aboriginal title, how is it protected by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, and what is required for its proof?.
D. Has a claim to self-government been made out by the appellants?
E. Did the province have the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either
under its own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act?61
The Court answers these five questions in ways that are troubling
for Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia who are attempting to
interrogate colonial assumptions. First, in regard to the pleadings, the
Court's treatment of its own procedural rules consolidates the Crown's
jurisdiction over Indigenous legal systems and subordinates them within
the Canadian legal structure. Second, in considering the trial judge's
factual findings, the Court subjects Aboriginal traditions to non-
Aboriginal authentication through affirming its authority to be the final
arbiter in the interpretation of facts, which are presented in a revised
treatment of oral evidence. Third, the Court's definition of Aboriginal
title undermines pre-existing Aboriginal land-use regimes through the
substructural placement of Crown title. This result compels Aboriginal
acceptance of, and reconciliation with, the colonization and
development of their lands by other peoples, and it places the Crown in
a superordinate position relative to Aboriginal peoples. Fourth, the
Court's discussion of Aboriginal self-government holds Aboriginal
sovereignty to stricter scrutiny and higher standards of proof than Crown
sovereignty in violation of fundamental principles of the rule of law.
Finally, the Court vests the federal Crown with authority to extinguish
Aboriginal rights in a manner contrary to foundational precepts of
Canadian constitutional law. This article explores these issues to
illustrate the unexamined implications that flow from the Court's
unreflective extension, and unquestioned acceptance, of Crown
assertions of sovereignty.
A. Pleadings
The common law grew out of a society in which a bewildering
diversity of courts, from a broad array of cultures, enforced various
61 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1061, Lamer C.J.C.
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bodies of law.62 Throughout the hills and hollows of England, there were
courts of equity, market courts, manor courts, and university courts,
along with county courts, borough courts, ecclesiastical courts,
aristocratic courts, and other courts.63 The common law's story is its
expansion at the expense of other legal jurisdictions through the use of
writs.6 4 The great English historian F.W. Maitland observed that writs
were the means whereby justice became centralized, whereby the king's
court drew away business from other courts.6S The common law in
mediaeval England was a formulary system, developed around a
complex of writs that a litigant could obtain from the Chancery to
initiate litigation in the Royal Courts. 66 Each writ gave rise to a specific
manner of proceeding or form of action, having its own particularized
rules and procedures. 67 These "forms of actions" were the procedural
devices courts used to give expression to the theories of liability
recognized by the common law.68 Through these writs, litigants elected
their remedies in advance of trial, and they could not subsequently
amend their pleadings to conform to the proof needed for the case or to
meet the court's choice of another theory of liability.69 If litigants did not
select the proper writ for their action, they could not succeed in their
claim. 70 This uniformity allowed for more centralized control of the
62 See P. Glenn, "The Common Law in Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 265, 276. See
also Sir M. Hale, The History of the Common Law of England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1971) at 39-43.
63 See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths,
1979).
64 See F.W. Maitland & F.C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History (New York:
Putnam, 1915) at 1-130.
65 See F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1948) at 11.
66 See Maitland & Montague, supra note 64 at 100-01.
67 See M. Furmston, ed., Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract, 11th ed. (London:
Butterworth & Co., 1986) at 2.
68 Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. "forms of action."
69 Ibid.
70 See A.K.R. Kiralfy, ed., Potter's Historical Introduction to English Law and Its Institutions
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1962) at 293-97.
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entire common law structure,71 and the sovereignty of the Crown
expanded with the extension of the common law's jurisdiction.72
In some respects, the issues in Delgamuukw show Canada, like
England, to be a place with a bewildering diversity of legal systems, a
broad array of cultures, and containing a variety of bodies of law. From
the Maritimes to the mountains, there are laws of the Mik'Maq,
Mohawk, Cree, Ojibway, Okanagan, Salish, Haida, Nisga'a, Gitksan,
Wet'suwet'en, and other peoples. The story of the common law in
Canada is its attempted expansion at the expense of these Indigenous
legal jurisdictions.7 3 Contemporary pleadings unwittingly perform a role
similar to the ancient forms of action, as parties present written
statements of factual and legal issues they believe the court can resolve.
While today's pleadings are infinitely more flexible than mediaeval
forms of action,74 if a party does not frame its case properly, the court
may refuse to resolve the issue before it by declaring a defect in the
pleadings. The discipline this uniformity imposes on litigants incidentally
extends Crown sovereignty through centralizing control of access to
justice. In effect, pleadings become a "necessary passport to gain entry
to the common law courts." 75 Acquiring such a visa is obligatory in
disputing the justice of Crown dealings with Aboriginal peoples-the
Crown does not recognize legal claims brought in any other way.76 This
71 See M.H. Ogilvie, Historical Introduction to Legal Studies (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 70,
101,106-07.
72 See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1981) at 11-36.
73 See, for example, J.Y. Henderson, "Micmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18 Dal.
L.J. 196.
74 The forms of action were abolished in the following Acts: An Act for the Limitation of
Actions and Suits relating to Real Property, and for simplifying the Remedies for trying the Rights thereto,
1833 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 27, s. 36; An Act to amend the Process, Practice, and Mode of Pleading
in the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, and in the Superior Courts of the Counties
Palatine of Lancaster and Durham, 1852 (U.K.), 15 & 16 Vict., c. 76; and Supreme Court of Judicature
Act, 1873 (U.K.), 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66.
75 Ogilvie, supra note 71 at 70.
76 In this regard Macfarlane J.A., delivering his reasons for judgment in Delgamuukw (B.C.
CA.), supra note 8, quotes A.V. Dicey, who wrote in Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1959) at 40 that "[t]here is no person or body or persons who can, under the
English Constitution, make rules which override or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which
(to express the same thing in other words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act
of Parliament."
1999]
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border patrol of the Canadian legal imagination 77 is effective in further
extending Canadian sovereignty over Aboriginal territories.78
The extension of Canadian sovereignty over Aboriginal
territories is witnessed in Delgamuukw, when the Supreme Court of
Canada did not consider the specific merits of the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en claims because of a defect in the pleadings. The Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en's pleadings originally put forth fifty-one claims on
behalf of individuals and Houses, claiming ownership and jurisdiction
over 133 territories. 79 The Court found that there were two changes in
these pleadings from the trial to the appeal: the first was that claims for
ownership and jurisdiction were replaced with claims for Aboriginal title
and self-government; the second was that the individual claims by each
House were amalgamated into two communal claims, one advanced on
behalf of each nation. The Court found that the first change concerning
the substitution of Aboriginal title and self-government was "just and
appropriate" in the circumstances because the trial judge allowed "a de
facto amendment to permit 'a claim for aboriginal rights other than
ownership and jurisdiction."'8 0 The Court upheld the trial judge's ruling
because "it was made against the background of considerable legal
uncertainty surrounding the nature and content of aboriginal rights
.... "81 However, the Court rejected the second change concerning the
amalgamation of individual claims into collective ones because the
77 See P. Macklem, "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal
Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 382.
78 It should be remembered that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en voluntarily submitted
themselves to the court's process when they drafted their pleadings and filed their statement of
claim. As a result, some may assert that they could not take issue with consolidation of the common
law's jurisdiction at the expense of Indigenous legal systems. However, it should also be noted that
in framing their case, they were "seeking recognition of their societies [native and non-native] as
equals and contemporaries": Spirit in the Land, supra note 2 at 21. In their opening statement, ibid.
at 8-9, the chiefs expressed their position as follows:
In your legal system, how will you deal with the idea that the Chiefs own the land? The
attempts to quash our laws and extinguish our system have been unsuccessful. Gisday Wa
has not been extinguished....
The purpose of this case then, is to find a process to place Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
ownership and jurisdiction within the context of Canada. We do not seek a decision as to
whether our system might continue or not. It will continue.
79 See Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1061, Lamer C.J.C.
80 Ibid. at 1062.
81 Ibid
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collective claims were seen to not be issues at trial.82 This finding seems
rather formalistic and inflexible, given that the Court gave considerable
importance to the connection that collective and individual claims are
intertwined, for "the territory claimed by each nation is merely the sum
of the individual claims of each House."83 It appeared that the forms of
action the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en pleaded had to be exact, even
though the Court itself found there to be considerable legal uncertainty.
The Court's approach supported Maitland's observation that "[t]he
forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."8 4
As such, the Court "reluctantly" concluded that the province had
suffered some prejudice because the plaintiffs change denied them "the
opportunity to know the appellants' case."85
It is interesting to note that in this historic case, which considers
the wholesale territorial dispossession of two entire Aboriginal peoples,
the ratio decidendi turns on the Court's finding that the province suffered
prejudice in considering this issue. There is something deeply troubling
about having to recognize Crown assertions of sovereignty in framing a
case to dispute the effect of these a~sertions. Given the imbalance in the
parties' financial and political resources, and the century-long denial of
Aboriginal land and political rights in British Columbia, this sleight of
hand is remarkable. In effect, the Court found that these peoples'
passport papers were out of order. They were not permitted to cross the
border separating Gitksan/Wet'suwet'en legal systems and the common
law because they had not followed proper procedures. Sovereignty's
extension is careful not to prejudice the Crown. In order to allow the
province a better opportunity to know the plaintiffs case, the Court
ordered a new trial.86
B. Factual and Evidentiary Findings of the Trial Judge
Canadian sovereignty is extended over Aboriginal peoples when
courts receive and interpret "factual" evidence from Aboriginal litigants.
82 Ibid. at 1063.
83 [bid.
84 Maitland, supra note 65 at 2.
8 5 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1063, Lamer C.J.C.
86 As a result, everything else the Court wrote after this point in the judgment can be regarded
as obiter dicta which, according to Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 68 (s.v. "obiter dictum"), are
"words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. ... Such are not binding as
precedent."
1999] 553
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For millennia, Aboriginal peoples created, controlled, and changed their
own worlds through the power of language, stories, and songs. These
words did not just convey meaning, they could also change reality, as
Indigenous languages and cultures shaped their legal, economic, and
political structures, and the socio-cultural relationships upon which they
were built.8 7 Many of these narratives were considered private
property.8 8 The restriction on their presentation and interpretation
helped to ensure that the authority to adjudicate and create meaning
remained within Aboriginal societies. When Aboriginal narratives are
given to another culture to authoritatively judge their factual
authenticity and meaning, Aboriginal peoples lose some of their power
of self-definition and self-determination.8 9
What constitutes a "fact" is largely contingent on the language
and culture out of which that information arises.90 The people who
decide what a fact is define it from within the matrix of relationships
they share with others.91 Non-Aboriginal judges do not usually share the
same language and relationships as Aboriginal peoples. Variations
between these groups help encode the same facts with different
meanings depending on the culture.92 Therefore, the cultural specificity
of facts may make it difficult for people from different cultures to
concur. This discrepancy creates an enormous risk of misunderstanding
and lack of recognition when one culture submits its facts to another
87 See P. Petrone, Native Literature in Canada: From Oral Tradition to the Present (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1990) at 9-12.
88 Ibid
89 One lawyer has commented on this process in Pinder, supra note 15 at 11-12 as follows:
What counts as fact? What can sustain us?
With more and more sophisticated technology we have destroyed the stories. In
court cases, we word search transcripts to reassemble the evidence; it doesn't resemble
anything that was said, by anyone. We cut the words, even our written words, away from
the environment, and hold them up as pieces of meaning, hacked up pieces of meaning.
As lawyers we don't have to take any responsibility to construct a world. We only
have to destroy another's construction. We say no. We are the civilized, well-heeled,
comfortable carriers of no. We thrive on it. Other races die.
90 See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2d ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1967) at paras. 154-55. Meaning and understanding of a fact, Wittgenstein writes, at
para. 155, is "know[ing] how to go on."
91 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper
& Row, 1962) at 157.
92 See C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985) at 119,121.
[VOL. 37 No. 3
1999] Sovereignty's Alchemy
culture for interpretation.93 In litigation, this problem is especially acute
because factual determinations can vary significantly between judicial
interpreters according to the judge's language, cultural orientation, and
experiences. 94 In such circumstances, common law judges have had an
especially difficult time understanding and acknowledging the meanings
Aboriginal peoples give to the facts they present. 95 Anthropologist
Robin Ridington observes these problems in the factual underpinnings
of the trial judge's decision in Delgamuukw:
McEachern showed himself to be singularly blind to the unstated assumptions of his own
culture. I suggest that a systemic and unacknowledged ethnocentric bias is, to use
McEachern's own phrasing, "fatal to the credibility and reliability" of his conclusions.
From my experience evaluating texts about a variety of cultures, McEachern's decision ...
reveals a sub-text of underlying but unexamined assumptions upon which the more
logical edifice of the judgment is constructed. In Delgamuukv, Mr. Justice McEachern
revealed a world view and an ideology appropriate to a culture of colonial expansion and
domination. The judgment is well suited to be an apology for that culture. It is not well
suited to find a place where aboriginal law and Canadian law can reach a just
accommodation. 96
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court's extension of the laws of
evidence to accommodate Aboriginal traditions and histories is meant to
counteract the difficulties found in McEachern C.J.'s factual findings.97
The Court wrote that in "cases involving the determination of aboriginal
rights, appellate intervention is ... warranted by the failure of a trial
court to appreciate the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating
aboriginal claims when, first, applying the rules of evidence and, second,
interpreting the evidence before it."98 These difficulties in applying
93 See R. Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz" (1986) 25 Mich. Q. Rev.
525; A.A. An-Na'im, "Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights" in A.A.
An-Na'im & F.M. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1990) 331.
94 See R.F. Devlin, "Judging and Diversity: Justice or Just Us?" (1996) 20:3 Prov. Judges J. 4.
95 See L. Mandell, "Native Culture on Trial" in S.L. Martin & K.E. Mahoney, eds., Equality
and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 358; J. Ryan & B. Ominayak, "The Cultural Effects
of Judicial Bias" in ibid., 346; and R. Ridington, "Cultures in Conflict: The Problem of Discourse"
in W.H. New, ed., Native Writers and Canadian Writing (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) 273.
96 R. Ridington, "Fieldwork in Courtroom 53: A Witness to Delgamuukw" in Cassidy, ed.,
supra note 3, 206 at 211-12.
97 See Delgainuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1079, where the Court says that "[t]he trial judge's
treatment of the various kinds of oral histories did not satisfy the principles I laid down in Van der
Peet. These errors are particularly worrisome ...."
98 Ibid. at 1065, Lamer C.J.C. The challenges of receiving Aboriginal evidence were described
by Lamer C.J.C., at 1068, quoting from C. McLeod, "The Oral Histories of Canada's Northern
People, Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada's Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking
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Aboriginal evidence prompted the Court to direct judges to "adapt the
laws of evidence so that the aboriginal perspective on their practices,
customs and traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given
due weight by the courts." 99 They further wrote that oral histories should
receive "independent weight" and be "placed on an equal footing with
the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with ... ."100 The
Court justified this more liberal approach to Aboriginal evidence by
noting that to do otherwise would "'impose an impossible burden of
proof on aboriginal peoples, and 'render nugatory' any rights that they
have" because "most aboriginal societies 'did not keep written
records."'lOl
However, the Court's progressive instruction to adapt the laws of
evidence to incorporate Aboriginal factual perspectives does not
scrutinize Crown assertions of sovereignty. Aboriginal title and
sovereignty are still diminished despite the Court's extraordinarily fair
and generous approach. For Indigenous peoples, the language and
Down the Barriers of the Past" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1276 at 1279:
Many features of oral histories would count against both their admissibility and their
weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional approach to the rules
of evidence. The most fundamental of these is their broad social role not only "as a
repository of historical knowledge for a culture" but also as an expression of "the values
and mores of [that] culture."
99 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1067, Lamer C.J.C. In this regard the chief justice,
citing his reasons for judgment in Van derPeet, also wrote, at 1065, that "courts must not undervalue
the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform
precisely with the evidentiary standards" that would be applied in private law cases [emphasis
omitted].
10ODelgamuukv (S.C.C.), supra note lat 1069. The Court's adaptation of evidentiary standards
finds parallels elsewhere in the jurisprudence. In the mid-eighteenth century, the courts drastically
changed the rules of evidence to receive commercial and merchant customs and evidence for
virtually the first time. The Delgamuuk-v case has been criticized by many in the business community
for the new "uncertain" evidentiary standards it creates. It is interesting and somewhat ironic to
note that the foundation of law protecting commercial transactions was as revolutionary in its time
as the Delgamuukw case may appear to business today. Ogilvie, supra note 71 at 345, noted the
radical evidentiary changes required to receive commercial customs into the common law:
Lord Mansfield can rightly be claimed to be the greatest justice in the common law and
his influence on numerous branches of law is felt still today. He also incorporated the law
merchant into the common law by ignoring the traditional procedural rules of the King's
Bench so as to allow for the expert evidence on mercantile practice heard by specially
selected juries of commercial men from the City. Moreover, he did not feel compelled to
equate the law merchant with feudal property law or to reinterpret it in that light, rather
he accepted the evidence and adopted it into the body of the common law, transforming
it into common or judge-made law at the same time.
Lord Mansfield's ground-breaking treatment of evidence in commercial law sounds like Lamer
C.J.C.'s treatment of Aboriginal evidence in Delgamuukw.
101 Delgamuukv (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1069, citing Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Simon, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 387 at 408.
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culture of law is not their own; legal interpretation of Aboriginal
traditions and history is centralized and administered by non-Aboriginal
people.102 Aboriginal peoples barely participate in the administration of
this system, and they are certainly not in positions of control.
Furthermore, the evidence they present to establish their case must not
"strain 'the Canadian legal and constitutional structure."'10 3 The
justification for this approach is that Aboriginal rights must be
reconciled with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over Canadian
territory.1 04 Once again, Crown sovereignty is the standard against which
Aboriginal rights must be measured. Sovereignty disciplines and defines
the terrain on which Aboriginal peoples must operate if they are going
to dispute the actions of Canadian governments in Canadian courts.lOS
Thus, even though the Court has made great efforts to ensure that the
"laws of evidence [are] adapted in order that [oral histories and
tradition] can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the
types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with," 106 the fact that
they must be reconciled with assertions of Crown sovereignty means
that, in the end, this new standard risks "perpetuating the historical
injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who
failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-existing aboriginal
societies." 1 07 Thus, there will be great difficulties for Aboriginal peoples
in Canadian courts that receive and evaluate their evidence, for "judges,
like all other humans, operate from their own perspectives."108 As
102 There are only sixteen Aboriginal judges in Canada, none of whom sit on an appellate
court. For an article that explains the importance of Aboriginal control over traditional knowledge
and culture, see G. Christie, "Aboriginal Rights, Aboriginal Culture, and Protection" (1998) 36
Osgoode Hall L.J. 447.
10 3 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1066, Lamer C.J.C.
104 Ibid. at 1065-66.
105 For a discussion of the connection between sovereignty, government, and discipline, see
M. Foucault, "Governmentality" in G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 87 at 102; more generally, see M.
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
106 Delgamuukw (S.C. C), supra note 1 at 1069, Lamer C.J.C.
10 7 CatM, supra note 39 at 175.
108 R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at 504, L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. [hereinafter
R.D.S.]. Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin similarly wrote, at 505, that
judges in a bilingual, multiracial and multicultural society will undoubtedly approach the
task of judging from their varied perspectives. They will certainly have been shaped by,
and have gained insight from, their different experiences, and cannot be expected to
divorce themselves from these experiences on the occasion of their appointment to the
bench.
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illustration, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that "[i]n applying
these principles, the new trial judge might well share some or all of the
findings of fact of McEachern C.J."09
C. Conjuring Sovereignty: Content, Protection,
and Proof ofAbotiginal Title
In its section considering the content and proof of Aboriginal
title, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote the following: "Because it does
not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that
title existed, aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was
asserted."110 Sovereignty is pretty powerful stuff. Its mere assertion by
one nation is said to bring another's land rights to a "definite and
permanent form;"]' simply conjuring sovereignty is enough to change
an ancient peoples' relationship with their land. A society under
sovereignty's spell is ostensibly transformed, for use and occupation are
found to be extinguished,112 infringed,113 or made subject to another's
designs.114 How can lands possessed by Aboriginal peoples for centuries
be undermined by another nation's assertion of sovereignty? What
alchemy transmutes the basis of Aboriginal possession into the golden
bedrock of Crown title? 115
The key words that unlock sovereignty's power are of ancient
origin. Practitioners of its craft can summon a tradition that reaches
deep into the past.11 6 It flows from classical times 1 7 through the
109 Delgamuuokv (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1079, Lamer C.J.C.
110 Ibid. at 1098 [emphasis added].
111 Funk & Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary, Can. ed., s.v. "crystallize."
112 See Delgamuukiv (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1116-17.
113 Ibid. at 1107-14.
114 Ibid. at 1088-91.
115 See M. Boas, The Scientific Renaissance, 1450-1630 (London: Collins, 1962) at 178, where
Paracelsus, a sixteenth-century German physician wrote that "[a]lchemy ... brings to its end that
which has not come to its end."
116 A brief intellectual background of the societies that developed this tradition is found in
J.R. Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada,
1994) at 355-72.
11 7 The Greek didactic poet Hesiod, who recorded the economic, political, and legal values of
the archaic period of Greek history, commented on the arbitrary fables and fictions of princes and
nobles that dispossessed other peoples: see D.W. Tandy & W.C Neale, Hesiod's Works and Days,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) at lines 202-12, where he wrote:
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Renaissance.1 8 Political and legal ascendancy are conveyed to those
who can conjure fictions that vindicate their claims of authority.119 In the
Now I will tell a fable to basilees, although they themselves perceive it. Thus the hawk
addressed the speckle-necked nightingale, as he carried her very high in the clouds,
keeping her snatched in his talons. She was weeping piteously, pierced by his curved
talons; he addressed her haughtily: "Strange one, why do you scream? Now one who is
much superior holds you. You will go wherever I myself carry you, even though you may
be a singer. A meal I will make of you, if I see fit, or I shall let you go. Foolish is he who
sees fit to set himself up against those who are better; he both loses the victory and
suffers pain in addition to disgrace." So spoke the swift-winged hawk, the long-winged
bird.
Ancient Rome also provides numerous examples of fictions that were used to deprive other nations
of political and legal rights. The myth of Romulus and Remus endeavoured to absolve Romans
from taking jurisdiction over Sabian and Etruscan peoples and lands: see I.S. Ryberg, trans.,
"Selections from Livy's History of Rome" in P. MacKendrick & H.M. Howe, eds., Classics in
Translation, vol. 2 (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980) 280 at 284-87. This myth
bred power, and Rome expanded at the expense of other nations. In A.D. 14, Augustus recorded the
raw fact of his nation's power "I extended the frontiers of all those provinces of the Roman People
which bordered nations not obedient to our command": C.F. Edson & C. Schuler, trans., "The
Deeds of the Deified Augustus" in ibid, 302 at 306. Eventually Rome's power was disseminated
through law and was effective in controlling the rights of others. For one example, see J.P.
Heironimus, trans., "Selected Letters of the Younger Pliny" in ibid., 361 at 366-67 (Pliny to the
Emperor Trajan).
118 See, for example, N. Machiavelli, "The Prince" in P.E. Bondanella & M. Musa, eds. and
trans., The Portable Machiavelli (New York: Penguin Books, 1979) 77 at 82-84, 133-36 [hereinafter
"The Prince"]; and N. Machiavelli, "The Discourses" in ibid., 167 at 193-96, 200-01, 208, 210, 216,
314-16, 412-13. Machiavelli argued for the use of fictions in the affairs of state. In "The Discourses"
he noted, at 216, that
[t]he auguries were not only ... the basis of the ancient religion of the pagans, but also the
cause of the well-being of the Roman republic; thus, the Romans took more care of this
institution than any other: they used the auspices in their consular meetings, in beginning
their enterprises, in marching forth their armies, in fighting their battles, and in all their
important actions, civil or military; never would they have set out on an expedition
without first having persuaded their soldiers that the gods had promised them victory.
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes also identified the importance of fictions, and created
the myth of the "Leviathan" to support the extension of civil authority over people: see R. Tuck, ed.,
Leviathan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 120, where he wrote:
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend ... is, to conferre
all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will ... . This is the Generation of
that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to
which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.
119 Plato wrote about the myth of the metals to explain why some people could claim rights
and enforce laws over others in G.M.A. Grube, trans., Plato's Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974)
at line 415a-e:
Socrates: [B]ut the god who fashioned you mixed some gold in the nature of those
capable of ruling because they are to be honoured most. In those who are auxiliaries he
has put silver, and iron and bronze in those who are farmers and other workers. ... Can
you suggest any device which will make our citizens believe this story?
Glaucon: I can not see any way ... to make them believe it themselves, but the sons and
later generations might ....
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thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV invoked sovereignty's oaths in the
Middle East during the Crusades when he wrote:
[I]s it licit to invade a land that infidels possess or which belongs to them? ... [T]he pope
has jurisdiction over all men and power over them in law ... so that through this power
which the pope possesses I believe that if a gentile, who has no law except the law of
nature ... does something contrary to the law of nature, the pope can lawfully punish him
.... [If the infidels do not obey, they ought to be compelled by the secular arm .... 120
Such words provided authority for asserting sovereignty and launching
war over non-Christian peoples outside Europe.1 21 In the fourteenth
century, papal bulls called up these same covenants as people sailed out
from Portugal and Spain to cast their words on Africa and North
America.122 Such assertions enabled Iberia's kings and queens to
"discover" and "conquer" lands beyond the recognized borders of
western Christianity.1 23 To facilitate these purposes, in 1513 another
manifestation of sovereignty's power was revealed in the Requerimiento,
which was to be read aloud to peoples over which Spain intended to
exercise control. 124 It stated the following:
Socrates: But let us leave this matter to later tradition. Let us now arm our earthborn and
lead them forth with their rulers in charge. And as they march let them look for the best
place in the city to have their camp, a site from which they could most easily control those
within, if anyone is unwilling to obey the laws....
120 Pope Innocent IV, "Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros Decretalium" in J.
Muldoon, ed., The Expansion of Europe: The First Phase (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania,
1977) 191 at 191-92 [translated by author].
121 See J. Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1979). Similar assertions were also used by those who resisted the Christians: see M.M.
Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran (New York: New American Library, 1953) at 64, 72,
86, 139-44. An Islamic perspective on law (the Shari' ah) and war can be found in S.H. Nasr, Ideals
and Realities of Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) at 31, 93-118.
122 See S.Z. Ehler & J.B. Morrall, eds. and trans., Church and State Through the Centuries
(London: Bums & Oates, 1954) at 144-46, 153-59. See also F.S. Cohen, "The Spanish Origins of
Indian Rights in the Law of the United States" (1942) 31 Geo. L.J. 1.
123 See D.H. Getches, C.F. Wilkinson & R.A. Williams, eds., Cases and Materials on Federal
Indian Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1993) at 46.
124 See L Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949) at 34:
A complete list of the events that occurred when the Requirement formalities ordered by
King Ferdinand were carried out in America, more or less according to the law, might tax
the reader's patience and credulity, for the Requirement was read to trees and empty
huts when no Indians were to be found. Captains muttered its theological phrases into
their beards on the edge of sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league away before
starting the formal attack, and at times some leather-lunged Spanish notary hurled its
sonorous phrases after the Indians as they fled into the mountains.
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On the part of the king, Don Ferdinand, and Dofia Juana, his daughter, queen of Castile
and Le6n, subduers of the barbarous nations, we their servants notify and make known to
you ... . Of all these nations God our lord gave charge to one man called St. Peter, that
he should be lord and superior to all the men in the world, that all should obey him ....
Wherefore, as best we can, we ask and require that you ... acknowledge the Church as
the ruler and superior of the whole world, and the high priest called Pope, and in his
name the king and queen .... But if you do not do this or if you maliciously delay in doing
it, I certify to you that with the help of God we shall forcefully enter into your country
and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you
to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their highnesses; we shall take you and
your wives and your children and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and
dispose of them as their highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods
and shall do to you all the harm and damage that we can ... and we protest that the
deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their
highnesses, or ours, or of these soldiers who come with us.125
Documents such as the Requerimiento, numerous papal bulls,
and other proclamations mingled to create a cant of conquest justifying
assertions of sovereignty over others' lands.126 The British and
Americans in the seventeenth,127 eighteenth, 128 and nineteenth
129
centuries chanted these historic rites to bring them forward into
125 C. Gibson, ed., The Spanish Tradition in America (Columbia, S.C.: University of South
Carolina Press, 1968) at 58-60.
126 For a detailed study of this phenomenon in northeastern North America, see F. Jennings,
The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: Norton, 1976).
127 In Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 E.R. 377 at 398 (K.B.), Lord Chief Justice
Edward Coke observed:
[I]f a King come to a Christian kingdom ... he may at his pleasure alter and change the
laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient laws
of that kingdom remain. But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel,
and bring them under his subjection, there ipsofacto the laws of the infidel are abrogated,
for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature....
128 The Royal Proclamation, 1763 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1, states:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of
our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected,
and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession
of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us, are reserved to them ... [emphasis added].
129 Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 at 573-74 (1823):
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be
regulated by themselves ...
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants
were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. ... [T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished....
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contemporary jurisprudence.1 30 Imperial courts participated too. In St.
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. R., a case from Ontario, Lord
Watson wrote:
[T]he tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the
good will of the Sovereign. The lands reserved are expressly stated to be "parts of Our
dominions and territories" .... It appears ... to be sufficient for the purposes of this case
that there has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and paramount estate,
underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum dominium whenever that title was
surrendered or otherwise extinguished.
13 1
Sovereignty's incantation is like magic. Its mantra is "Aboriginal title is a
burden on the Crown's underlying title."132 This mere assertion is said to
displace previous Indigenous titles by making them subject to, and a
burden on, another's higher legal claims.133 Contemporary Canadian
jurisprudence has been susceptible to this artifice.1 34 In its section
considering Aboriginal title, the Supreme Court declared that the Crown
gained "underlying title" when "it asserted sovereignty over the land in
question."1 35 This announcement illustrates that, as in past centuries,
sovereignty heralds the diminishment of another's possessions. In this
respect, the decision echoes ancient discourses of conquest. Is this, as
the Court requires of its jurisprudence, "a morally and politically
defensible conception of aboriginal rights"? 136 Is the mere assertion of
sovereignty an acceptable justification for the Crown's displacement of
Indigenous titles?
It does not make sense that one could secure a legal entitlement
to land over another merely through raw assertion. As Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court once observed, it is an
130 For an excellent discussion of this process, see R.A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in
Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
131 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54-55 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling].
132 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1098.
133 See Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 378 [hereinafter Guerin]: "The principle of
discovery ... gave ultimate title in the land in a particular area to the nation which had discovered
and claimed it. In that respect at least the Indians' rights in the land were obviously diminished."
134 See Sparrow, supra note 54 at 1103, where the Court wrote: "[Tihere was from the outset
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such
lands vested in the Crown."
13 5 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1098.
136 Van der Peet, supra note 56 at 547, citing Walters, supra note 15 at 413.
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"extravagant and absurd idea."137 It is even less of a "morally and
politically defensible" position when this assertion has not been a neutral
and noble statement, but has benefited the Crown to the detriment of
the land's original inhabitants. As such, "it does not make sense" to
speak of Aboriginal title as being a "burden" on the Crown's underlying
title. As "it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying
title before the title existed," 138 Aboriginal peoples wonder how it
"makes sense" that Crown title "crystallized at the time sovereignty was
asserted." 39 The Court might as well speak of magic crystals being
sprinkled on the land as a justification for the diminution of Aboriginal
occupation and possession. Crown title simply does not make sense to
Aboriginal people (and one suspects to many non-Aboriginal people).
The contemporary reliance on assertions of sovereignty seems to
"perpetuat[e] the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at
the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of
pre-existing aboriginal societies."140 It causes one to wonder "whatever
the justification advanced in earlier days" whether "an unjust and
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can [any] longer be accepted."141
In keeping with these observations, the Court recognized that its
past decisions have not made much sense of Aboriginal title. It noted
that "there has never been a definitive statement ... on the content of
aboriginal title." 42 It also stated that its terminology has not been
"particularly helpful," 143 and that "the courts have been less than
forthcoming."144 The Supreme Court's recent contribution to clearing
up this confusion was to characterize Aboriginal title as sui generis.'45
The Court described Aboriginal title as sui generis in order to distinguish
137 In Worcester, supra note 42 at 544-45, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he extravagant
and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom
they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from
sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man."
138 Delgainuukwv (S.C C.), supra note I at 1098, Lamer C.J.C.
139 ibid.
140 C6td, supra note 39 at 175.
141 Mabo, supra note 59 at 67.
142 Delgamnuukw (S.C.C.),supra note I at 1083 [emphasis in original].
143 Ibid. at 1081.
144 Ibid. at 1083.
145 In characterizing the Aboriginal right in question (in this case, title) as sui generis, the
Court continued a trend made explicit in Guerin,supra note 133. For further discussion of the sui
generis nature of Aboriginal rights, see J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of
Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9.
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it from "normal" proprietary interests.1 46 While many Aboriginal people
would agree that a legal doctrine that diminishes Aboriginal rights in
ancient territories is "abnormal," the Court cast the doctrine's
distinctiveness in another light. It held that Aboriginal title is
sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by
reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property
found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, [Aboriginal title] must
be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives. 147
The Court found that "[t]he idea that aboriginal title is sui generis is the
unifying principle underlying the various dimensions of that title."148
While the Court's delineation of Aboriginal rights as sui generis
by reference to Aboriginal perspectives is preferable to having them
defined solely through a reliance on the common law,)49 these
perspectives still have to be reconciled with British assertions of
146 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1081.
147 Ibid. at 1081, Lamer C.J.C. The reliance on the suigeneris nature of Aboriginal title affirms
the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncement in St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook, [1997] 2 S.C.R.
657 at 667 [hereinafter St Mary's]: "[Niative land rights are in a category of their own, and as such,
traditional real property rules do not aid the Court in resolving" Aboriginal land rights cases. In
applying the sui generis nature of Aboriginal land rights in the St. Mary's case, the Court considered
whether a portion of the reserve surrendered to the Federal Crown to construct an airport was
absolute. The Band levied property taxes on Cranbrook because it believed the land on which the
airport was built was still reserve land because it fell within section 83(1) of the Indian Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. 1-5, as land surrendered "otherwise than absolutely": St. Mary's, ibid. at 661. The Band
arrived at this position because the parties agreed at the time of surrender "that should at any time
the said lands cease to be used for public purposes they will revert to the St. Mary's Indian Band
free of charge": ibid. In rejecting the Band's position, the Supreme Court held that the lands were
surrendered absolutely. The Court arrived at this conclusion by looking at the "true purpose of the
dealings" instead of the "formalistic and arguably alien common law rules" that the Band was
relying on to advance its claim: ibid.at 669. By looking at the intent of the parties at the time of
surrender, rather than conventional property law rules, the Court found that the Band "intended to
part with the airport lands on an absolute basis," and thus denied their claim: ibid. It justified this
approach by observing that the "suigeneris nature of Native land rights means that common law real
property principles do not apply to the surrender of Indian reserve lands": ibid. at 664. Thus the
band's attempt to broaden its taxation power were defeated.
148 Delgamuukw (S.C.C:), supra note 1 at 1081. Various dimensions of that title include its
inalienability except to the Crown, its source, and the communal nature of its holding. Inalienability
is referenced to assertions of sovereignty because "[l]ands held pursuant to aboriginal title cannot
be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown": ibid. Its source is referenced
to assertions of sovereignty because it "arises from possession before the assertion of British
sovereignty": ibid. at 1082 [emphasis in original]. Its communal nature is referenced to British
sovereignty because "[a]boriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons," which is a
common law legal fiction created to ensure that only the Crown receives title from an Aboriginal
nation: ibid
149 For a discussion of this principle, see J. Borrows, "With or Without You: First Nations
Law (in Canada)" (1996) 41 McGill LJ. 629.
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sovereignty. This reconciliation might not have been troubling had the
Court recognized that Aboriginal legal and political rights could not be
diminished without Aboriginal authorization.150 However, the Court did
not take this path. It chose to find that the "reconciliation of aboriginal
prior occupation with the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown"l15
displaces the fuller pre-existent rights of the land's original occupants.
The Court noted that
[b]ecause ... distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader
social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are
circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial
importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that aboriginal
societies are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be justifiable.
Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the
broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are,
where the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader
community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.152
Thus, the Court's approach to reconciliation forcibly includes non-treaty
Aboriginal peoples within Canadian society and subjects them to an
alien sovereignty, even though most have never consented to such an
arrangement.153 This inclusion subordinates Aboriginal sovereignty, and
it limits the uses to which Aboriginal peoples' land can be put. The
implications of this approach deeply undermine original Aboriginal
entitlements-on grounds none other than self-assertion!1 5 4 The
limitations placed on Aboriginal peoples without their consent are
15 0 See D. Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands in Canada: Consent or Coercion? (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatoon Native Law Centre, 1989).
151 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1107, citing Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 723 at 774 [hereinafter Gladstone].
152 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1107-08, citing Lamer C.J.C. in Gladstone, supra note
151 at 774-75 [emphasis omitted].
153 See Tennant, supra note 51 at 62, where the following observation made by the Nisga'a
people in 1887 is cited:
The land was given to our fore-fathers by the great God above, who made both white
man and the Indian, and our forefathers [sic] handed it down and we have not given it to
anyone. It is still ours, and will be ours till we sign a strong paper to give part of it to the
Queen.
154 See R. Howse & A. Malkin, "Canadians are a Sovereign People: How the Supreme Court
Should Approach the Reference on Quebec Secession" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 186 at 192, n. 22,
where they observe the following:
If the constitution can only defend itself through self-assertion of its bindingness then this
invites an opposite self-assertion of those who seek to reject the constitutional order as a
whole, and the matter cannot but be resolved except through an implicitly violent struggle
of wills. This is the dangerous and fateful implication of the positivistic approach [to
constitutional interpretation].
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reminiscent of the sorcery that declared that there has been "vested in
the Crown a substantial and paramount estate, underlying the Indian
title"155 and that "the tenure of the Indians was ... dependent upon the
good will of the Sovereign."' 56
The Supreme Court's tautology does not adequately displace the
trial judge's finding that "authorities make it clear that such sovereignty
exists not just against other 'civilized' powers but extends to the natives
themselves ... . None of them suggest that the Crown, upon asserting
sovereignty, does not acquire title to the soil."15 7 At trial, McEachern
C.J. spoke about the effect of Crown sovereignty as being "far more
pervasive than the outcome of a battle or a war could ever be."158 He
stated that "the events of the last 200 years are far more significant than
any military conquest or treaties would have been,"1 59 and he concluded
that Aboriginal people "became a conquered people, not by force of
arms, for that was not necessary, but by an invading culture and a
relentless energy with which they would not, or could not, compete." 60
The Court's failure to explain or distance itself from the conventional
justifications for the assertion of sovereignty demonstrates why
reconciling Aboriginal perspectives with the common law is troubling for
Aboriginal peoples. It is asking them to reconcile their perspectives with
the pretence that mere Crown assertions of sovereignty have displaced
underlying Aboriginal title. As current jurisprudence stands, Aboriginal
peoples are being asked to harmonize their perspectives with the notion
that they are conquered. 16' Until the Supreme Court develops a
155 St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 131 at 55.
156 Ibid. at 54.
157 Delgamuukw (B.C. S.C.), supra note 4 at 284, McEachern C.J.
158 Ibid. at 285.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid. at 342. The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment when it wrote
in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 at 289-90 (1955): "Every American schoolboy
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land."
161 In Monet & Wilson, supra note 15 at 196, Skanu'u (Ardythe Wilson-Gitksan) responded to
such notions with the following observation:
[T]he reality is that, historically and to the present, we have been active in our resistance
to be silenced and to be made invisible. The reality is that we have never given up, never
sold, nor lost in battle, our ownership and jurisdiction to our territories. Our right and
title is inherited from our ancestors who lived and governed themselves for thousands of
years before Christopher Columbus emerged from his mother's womb and drew his first
breath. The reality is that Delgamuukw vs. The Queen is only one of the many
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(persuasive) explanation for how the assertion of Crown sovereignty
"crystallized" Aboriginal title, Aboriginal perspectives cannot be made
to agree with such enchantments1 62
1. Restricting Aboriginal title
Conjuring Crown assertions of sovereignty validates the
appropriation of Aboriginal land for non-Aboriginal people. It sanctions
the colonization of British Columbia and directs Aboriginal peoples to
reconcile their perspectives with the diminution of their rights. The
Court's invocation of Crown assertions, behind the cloak of sovereignty,
endorses the infringement of Aboriginal rights in furtherance of
legislative objectives that are "compelling and substantial"1 63 to the
"European colonizers."164 As such, the Court writes:
In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the
infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be traced to
the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the
assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition that "distinctive aboriginal
societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic
community" ... . In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and
hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British
Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the
simultaneous activities undertaken by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en to protest the abuses
of the Agents of the Crown since their first encroachment on to our territories. The
reality is that our societies, our cultures and our systems are alive and well. They have
sustained us through more than 150 of the darkest, most destructive years that our people
have ever known and will continue to sustain us....
162 Political events are contingent and so cannot be named or known in terms of existing
conceptual categories: see L.J. Disch, "More Truth than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding
in the Writings of Hannah Arendt" (1993) 21 Pol. Theory 665 at 683:
In Third Critique, Kant introduces "crystallization" as a metaphor for contingency ....
Crystallization describes the formation of objects that come into being not by gradual,
evolutionary process but suddenly and unpredictably "by a shooting together, i.e. by a
sudden solidification." ... In calling totalitarianism "the final crystallizing catastrophe"
that constitutes it various "elements" into a historical crisis, Arendt makes an analogy
between contingent beauty and unprecedented evil [emphasis in original].
Could the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Crown's crystallization of title be analogized as an
acceptance of an act of totalitarianism by the Crown, an evil that constitutes its various elements
into a historical crisis? For further discussion of Arendt's work, see L.J. Disch, Hannah Arendt and
the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
163 Delgamuukiv (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1107, Lamer C.J.C.
164 Ibid. at 1103.
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kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the
infringement of aboriginal title. 165
Words, as bare assertions, are pulled out of the air to justify a basic tenet
of colonialism: the settlement of foreign populations to support the
expansion of non-Indigenous societies. Colonization is not pretty, when
you look into it.166 In reconciling Crown assertions of sovereignty with
ancient rights stemming from Aboriginal occupation, the Court labels
colonization as an "infringement" (as if the interference with another
Nation's independent legal rights were a minor imposition and at the
fringes of the parties' relationship). Calling colonization "infringement"
is an understatement of immense proportions. While these
"infringements" must be "consistent with the special fiduciary
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples,")6 7 the effect of
the Court's treatment of "infringement" is to make Aboriginal land
rights subject to the "colonizer's" objectives.168 In effect, the assertion of
sovereignty places Aboriginal peoples in a dependent feudal relationship
with the Crown.169
165 Ibid. at 1111 [emphasis in original]. In commenting on this paragraph in "New Directions
in the Law of Aboriginal Rights" (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 36 at 62, Catherine Bell has observed that
the "fact that many of these objectives fall within provincial jurisdiction suggests that 'how' not
'whether' rights have been infringed, is the proper focus of future discussions between the parties,"
For a critique of the infringement of constitutional Aboriginal rights, see K. McNeil, "How Can
Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" (1997) 8 Const.
Forum 33.
166 I am paraphrasing Joseph Conrad, who wrote, in D.C.R.A. Goonetilleke, ed., Heart of
Darkness, 2d ed. (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1999) at 65, that "[t]he conquest of the
earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly
flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much." The process of
colonization was described by Machiaevelli in "The Prince," supra note 118 at 82-83:
Colonies do not cost much, and with little or no expense a prince can send and maintain
them; and in so doing he offends only those whose fields and houses have been taken and
given to the new inhabitants, who are only a small part of that state; and those that he
offends, being dispersed and poor, cannot ever threaten him, and all the others remain on
the one hand unharmed (and because of this, they should remain silent), and on the other
afraid of making a mistake, for fear that what happened to those who were dispossessed
might happen to them.
167 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at.1 108.
168 "[Bloth the federal ... and provincial ... governments" can exercise this power: ibid. at
1107. For further critique of the Court's test for infringement, see K. McNeil, Defining Aboriginal
Title in the 90's: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got it Right? (Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian
Studies, 1998).
169 The United States Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 at 26-
27 (1831) observed:
They have in Europe sovereign and demi-sovereign states and states of doubtful
sovereignty. But this state [Indian Nations], if it be a state, is still a grade below them all:
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This dependent relationship, and the effects of sovereignty's
assertion, are further illustrated by the Court's description of the content
of Aboriginal title. It is, schizophrenically, "a right to the land itself"1 70
that is held by the Crown for the use and benefit of the Aboriginal
group.171 While Aboriginal peoples may use their title lands for a variety
of purposes,172 the fact that this title is held by another places Aboriginal
peoples in a position analogous to serfs, dependent on their lord to hold
the land in their best interests.1 73 Why should Her Majesty hold
Aboriginal land, when Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia have not
ceded this interest? Why should a legal fiction permit the Crown to
dispossess original inhabitants of their radical title when the legal fact of
Aboriginal possession has not been refuted? 174
While the Court was careful to note that "aboriginal title is not
restricted to those uses which are elements of a practice, custom or
tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group
claiming the right,"1 75 the Court nonetheless restricted Aboriginal title
in another related way. The Court found, quoting from Guerin,176 that
"the same legal principles governed the aboriginal interest in reserve
for not to be able to alienate without permission of the remainder-man or lord, places
them in a state of feudal dependence.
170 Delganuukav (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1096.
171 Ibid. at 1085-86.
172 Ibid. at 1083.
173 Feudal tenure gave important rights to the lord, vis-dt-vis the tenant, which are analogous
to the Crown/Aboriginal relationship, as explained by Milsom, supra note 72 at 100:
Rights are dependent upon a lord seen as having total control of his lordship. A tenant is
in by the lord's allocation. He can have no more by way of title, unless it is some
obligation on the lord to keep him in, or to admit his successors. He cannot by his own
transaction confer whatever title he has upon another: he can only surrender it to the lord
who may then admit another. And he cannot by himself engage in dispute about the land:
in principle, the lord must decide who is to be his tenant.
174 See K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 107
[hereinafter Common Law Aboiginal Title], where McNeil refuted this assertion:
The fiction of original Crown ownership and grants was invented to explain how this
feudal relationship arose. That is the fiction's purpose, and that is the extent of its
application. The doctrine of tenures, thought capable at common law of giving the Crown
a title to land in the event an estate held of it expired, cannot be used otherwise to claim
lands which subjects possess.
175 Delagamnuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1087-88. For a critique of the restriction on
Aboriginal rights by reference to Aboriginal pre-contact practices, see R.L. Barsh & J.Y.
Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand"
(1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993; B.W. Morse, "Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the
Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 1011; and J. Borrows, "Frozen Rights in
Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster" (1997) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37.
176 Supra note 133.
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lands and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title."177 Aboriginal peoples
will find little solace in the statement that "[t]he Indian interest in the
land is the same in both cases." 178 The similarity of reserve land and title
land restricts Aboriginal title because "the nature of the Indian interest
in reserve land" is "held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of the
respective bands for which they were set apart ... ."179 While the Court
focuses on the similarity between title and reserves to demonstrate the
"breadth" of uses for "any ... purpose for the general welfare of the
band,"180 its reasons ignore the fact that this similarity removes the
underlying title from the land's original inhabitants and vests this title
interest in another. This dispossession demonstrates the feudal character
of the Crown/Aboriginal relationship concerning land. Even though the
content of Aboriginal title encompasses "the broad notion of use and
possession ... which incorporates a reference to the present-day needs of
aboriginal communities,"181 such use occurs within the context of the
Crown's radical position as lord over the land. The Court's expansive
description of the content of Aboriginal title for the "general welfare of
the band"l8 2 is betrayed by the narrow construction upon which it rests.
It gives Aboriginal peoples broad rights over a limited, diminished
interest in land.
The inherent limitation the Court finds attached to Aboriginal
lands demonstrates the Crown's feudalistic relationship to Aboriginal
peoples. For example, the chief justice observed that the "content of
aboriginal title contains an inherent limit that lands held pursuant to
title cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of
the claimants' attachment to those lands."183 This restriction significantly
undermines Aboriginal title because it compels Aboriginal peoples to
surrender their lands to the Crown if they want to use them for certain
"non-Aboriginal" purposes. While the Court was anxious not to restrict
Aboriginal land rights "to those activities that have traditionally been
177 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.),supra note 1 at 1085, Lamer C.J.C.
1781Ibid.
179 Ibid., citing section 18 of theIndianAct,supra note 147.
18 0 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1, citing section 18(2) of the Indian Act, supra note 147.
181 Ibid. at 1085-86.
182 Ibid. at 1086.
183 Ibid. at 1088.
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carried out on it,"184 it is difficult to read the Court's inherent limits in
any other way.185 The Court found that the nature of the group's
attachment to lands "is determined by reference to the activities that
have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has been put
by the particular group" because of the "special bond" that makes the
land part of the group's distinctive culture.186 As a result, if occupation
of Aboriginal land is established by reference to certain activities, the
group cannot use the land "in such a fashion as to destroy its value for
such a use."187 In such instances, "[i]f aboriginal peoples wish to use
their lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, then they must
surrender those lands and convert them into non-title lands to do so."188
The unspoken hex of sovereignty places the Crown in the position of
receiving and re-designating Aboriginal lands if they are used in
nontraditional ways. Why does the Crown take this pre-eminent role
here?189 The fact that Aboriginal peoples would have to "alienate" or
"surrender" their lands to the Crown to use them for these other
purposes indicates that at some level the Court, despite its claims
otherwise, is defining the content of Aboriginal title by reference to
184 Ibid. at 1091. An example of the increased powers Aboriginal peoples might enjoy relative
to participation and consultation in lands and resources is found in Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. v.
Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 519 (F.C. T.D.), where the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans' allocation of fish was set aside because it did not conform to
consultation requirements set out in the Nunavut Agreement. While this case may be distinguished
from issues of title because consultation between the minister and the Aboriginal group was
mandated by agreement, one might also find courts taking a similar stance relative to title given
Delgamuuklv's strong requirement for Aboriginal participation where title is found to exist. If
British Columbia courts were to review ministerial decisionmaking as the Federal Court did, then
resource allocation and management in the province would eventually undergo substantial changes.
185 For discussion of this point, see The Honourable Mister Justice D. Lambert, "Van der Peet
and Delgamuukwv: Ten Unresolved Issues" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 249 at 258-59.
186 Delgamuukv (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1089. The Court went on to add, ibid., that these
"elements of aboriginal title," referring to the traditional activities and use of the land by Aboriginal
peoples, "create" the "inherent limitation on the uses to which the land, over which such title exists,
may be put."
187 Ibid. The Court said, ibidt, "[flor example, if occupation is established with reference to the
use of the land as a hunting ground" it cannot strip mine it. The Court continued, ibid.:
Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or
cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that relationship
(e.g., by developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into
a parking lot).
188 Ibid. at 1091.
189 When did Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia ever agree to the Crown being able to
receive and redesignate their lands if they were used for "unauthorized" (as defined by non-
Aboriginal courts) purposes?
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
traditional activities. Such definition makes Aboriginal title an inferior
interest.19 o Establishing title by reference to specific practices is
potentially inconsistent with the Court's later statement that "aboriginal
title differs from other aboriginal rights ... , [which are defined] in terms
of activities."191 If Aboriginal title confers "the right to the land
itself,"192 then the Court's description of inherent limits in terms of
activities may well place Aboriginal peoples in a legal strait-jacket
concerning their uses, and the polity with which they deal with these
interests.193
Finally, the Court's test for the proof of Aboriginal title also
demonstrates how the interest in land is defined by reference to
assertions of Crown sovereignty. Non-Aboriginal sovereignty permeates
the criteria Aboriginal groups must satisfy "to make out a claim for
aboriginal title."194 For example, in order to establish title, Aboriginal
peoples have to prove that "(i) the land must have been occupied prior
to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of
occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present
and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation
must have been exclusive." 195 Why should Aboriginal groups bear the
burden of proving their title and the Crown be presumed to possess it
through bare words? Could the Crown establish occupation of land prior
to sovereignty? Could the Crown show continuity of occupation between
present and pre-sovereignty occupation? Could the Crown show that at
sovereignty its occupation was exclusive? The Court's mantra of Crown
sovereignty is repeated over and over again as the measuring rod for the
proof of Aboriginal title. This sceptre is waved at each stage of the
Court's test to ensure that proof of Aboriginal occupancy reconciles
prior Aboriginal occupation of North America with the assertion of
Crown sovereignty.196 Why should the Aboriginal group bear the burden
of reconciliation by proving its occupation of land? After all, the Crown
is the subsequent claimant. Why should the Crown not have to prove its
190 The definition of Aboriginal rights according to traditional activities is criticized in articles
by Barsh & Henderson, Morse, and Borrows: see note 175, supra.
191 Delgamuuk)v (S.C.C.),supra note 1 at 1095.
192 Ibid.
193 One can anticipate numerous judicial contests concerning the elements of Aboriginal title
that prohibit its use "in a way that aboriginal title does not permit": ibid. at 1091.
194 ibid. at 1097..
195 Ibid. [emphasis added].
196 Ibid. at 1100.
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land claims? 197 The Court's acceptance of assertions of Crown
sovereignty ensures that the Crown does not have to meet this burden; it
is not held to the same strict legal standard as Aboriginal peoples in
proving its claims. This double standard is deeply discriminatory and
unjust because it holds Aboriginal peoples to a higher standard in
proving title, a standard that the Crown itself could not meet. The
Crown does not have to meet any tests of occupation and exclusivity at
the time of sovereignty; 198 the Crown gains its title through mere
assertion. As the Court states, "[b]ecause it does not make sense to
speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed,
aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted."199
Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for relieving the
Crown of this burden, an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of this kind
can no longer be accepted.
The Court's approach should be contrasted with statements
made in 1888 by the Niiga'a, neighbours of the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en:
[W]hat we don't like about the Government is their saying this: "We will give you this
much land." How can they give it when it is our own? We cannot understand it.... They
have never fought and conquered our people and taken the land in that way, and yet they
say now that they will give us so much land-our own land. These chiefs do not talk
foolishly, they know the land is their own; our forefathers for generations and generations
past had their land here all around us; chiefs have had their own hunting grounds, their
salmon streams, and places where they got their berries; it has always been so. It is not
only during the last four or five years that we have seen the land; we have always seen and
owned it; it is no new thing, it has been ours for generations. If we had only seen it for
twenty years and claimed it as our own, it would have been foolish, but it has been ours
197 The Court said, ibid. at 1101, citing Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 174 at 201-02
that, since at common law physical occupation is proof of possession, title "may be established in a
variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of
fields to regular use of definite tracts for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources." The
Court further noted, citing B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev.
727 at 758, that "[i]n considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established, 'one
must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and technological
abilities, and the character of the lands claimed."'
198 InDelgamuuklv (S.C.C.),supra note 1 at 1104, the Court wrote the following:
The requirement for exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, because
I have defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of
land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal community which
holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title. The proof of
title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right [emphasis in original].
199 Ibid. at 1098.
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for thousands of years. If any strange person came here and saw the land for twenty years
and claimed it, he would be foolish. We have always got our living from the land .... 200
D. The Claim to Self-Government
In its brief two-paragraph examination of self-government, the
Court again revealed the effect of unreflectingly accepting final Crown
sovereignty on its comprehension of the issues before it.201 After relying
on assertionsof Crown sovereignty to ground Crown rights throughout
the judgment, the Court did not extend to Aboriginal peoples
equivalent, generous treatment concerning the effects of Aboriginal
sovereignty. Relying on its earlier judgment in R. v. Pamajewon,202 the
Court reasserted that Aboriginal "rights to self-government, if they
200 David McKay, cited in Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 319
[hereinafter Calder]. See also the statement of Nisga'a Gideon Minesque in 1915, which appears in
Calder at 359:
[W]e have been living here from time immemorial-it has been handed down in legends
from the old people and that is what hurts us very much because the white people have
'come along and taken this land away from us. I myself am an old man and as long as I
have lived, my people have been telling me stories about the flood and they did not tell
me that I was only to live here on this land for a short time. We have heard that some
white men, it must have been in Ottawa; this white man said they must be dreaming when
they say they own the land upon which they live. It is not a dream-we are certain that
this land belongs to us. Right up to this day the government never made any treaty, not
even to our grandfathers or our great-grandfathers.
201 The case of Tsawwassen Indian Band v. Delta (Corp.) (1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 672 (B.C.
C.A.) [hereinafter Tsawwassen] demonstrates that some courts seem more willing to interpret the
common law and applicable legislation to harmonize the emergence of Indian self-government with
existing Canadian governance. This development bodes well for those who are concerned with
stability and certainty in any changes brought about through the expansion of Indian powers.
Tsawwassen concerned the relationship between Indian bands and municipalities relative to taxation
and the provisions of community services. Two bands separately invoked provisions of the Indian
Self Government Enabling Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 219 to tax land occupied by non-Aboriginal
residents on their reserves. As a result, the municipalities that had provided services to the reserves
sought to discontinue them. The court held that the municipalities could not discontinue these
services without reasonable notice because of a common law duty imposed on them through their
relationship with the bands. The municipalities' common law duty was found in Canada (Minister of
Justice) v. Levis (Town of, [1919] A.C. 505 (P.C.), and was also grounded in the fact that the
municipalities were dealers in public services, which gave them advantages over the bands in terms
of control, experience, and long-held legislative power. The Indian Self Govemnent Enabling Act
was found not to have abrogated this duty; however, the court found in Tsawwassen, ibid. at 687 that
these duties were not indefinite because it was "feasible for the Bands to eventually become self-
sufficient with respect to the provision of services." Since the band's population and powers of
governance made it possible for them to provide these services in the foreseeable future, the
municipal duty to proVide services could be severed through reasonable notice. The court remitted
the question of what amounts to reasonable notice to the trial court.
202 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821.
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existed, cannot be framed in excessively general terms."203 The contrast
in the Court's treatment of Crown and Aboriginal sovereignty could not
be more striking. The Court was quite willing to frame Crown rights to
self-government in the most "excessive and general" of terms; simple
utterances were sufficient to grant the Crown the widest possible range
of entitlements to others' ancient rights. On the other hand, detailed
evidence concerning Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en sovereignty over specific
people and territory (Houses, clans, chiefs, Feasts, crests, poles, laws,
and so forth) was too broad to "lay down the legal principles to guide
future litigation." 204 As a result, the Court held that the advancement of
the Aboriginal right to self-government in the supposedly broad terms
before it was not cognizable under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.205 Is the Crown's assertion of broad rights of Crown sovereignty
any more cognizable, given its unexamined extension and unquestioned
acceptance by the Court in this case? Where, in this treatment, is
"equality before the law"? 20 6
Given that Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia were not
conquered and never agreed to diminish their governmental rights,
Aboriginal sovereignty should be placed on at least the same, if not
greater, footing as Crown sovereignty. It would be interesting to subject
the Court's treatment of Crown sovereignty to the same standards it
expects for evidence of Aboriginal self-government. If this approach was
followed, perhaps the same would be said of Crown sovereignty as the
Court wrote of Aboriginal sovereignty:
The broad nature of the claim at trial also led to a failure by the parties to address many
of the difficult conceptual issues which surround the recognition of [Crown] self-
government. ... We received little in the way of submissions that would help us to grapple
with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance from the parties, it would be
2 03 Delganmuukiv (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1114.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 The principle of equality before the law was explained in Canada (A.G.) v. Lavell (1973),
[1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1366:
"[E]quality before the law" ... is frequently invoked to demonstrate that the same law
applies to the highest official of government as to any other ordinary citizen, and in this
regard Professor F.R. Scott, in delivering the Plaunt Memorial Lectures on Civil Liberties
and Canadian Federalism in 1959, speaking of the case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis, had
occasion to say:
It is always a triumph for the law to show that it is applied equally to all
without fear or favour. This is what we mean when we say that all are equal
before the law.
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imprudent for the Court to step into the breach. In these circumstances, the issue of
[Crown] self-government will fall to be determined at trial.
20 7
Of course, this statement was written as a commentary on Aboriginal
sovereignty, not Crown sovereignty, and the Court was unwilling to "step
into the breach" to consider the conceptual issues surrounding
Aboriginal self-government. Why did the Court cross this divide so easily
to recognize Crown self-government throughout the judgment? This
discrepancy requires further explanation by the Court. The implications
of the assertion of Crown sovereignty need to be more carefully
scrutinized to assess the legality and justice of the non-consensual
colonization of British Columbia. Without such an examination, the
unequal treatment of Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty perpetuates
historical injustices and therefore fails to respect the distinctive cultures
of pre-existing Aboriginal societies in contemporary Canadian society.208
1. The Court's range in reviewing sovereignty
In suggesting that the Court interrogate Crown assertions of
sovereignty, a central question remains: are the courts permitted to
engage in such an inquiry? The answer is yes; Canadian courts are not
prevented from reviewing Sovereign acquisitions of new territory in
cases dealing with Aboriginal title.209 The "Act of State" doctrine, which
deals with this issue, was examined by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Calder case and was found not to apply. Justice Hall gave two
reasons why it was inappropriate to extend the Act of State doctrine to
cases dealing with Aboriginal title. First, "it has never been invoked in
claims dependent on aboriginal title"210 and, therefore, a finding that the
Act of State doctrine applied to cases dealing with Aboriginal title would
be unprecedented and unsupported by the jurisprudence. Second, the
Act of State doctrine only deals with situations where a "Sovereign, in
dealings with another Sovereign (by treaty of cession or conquest)
acquires land." 211 British Columbia did not acquire Gitksan and
2 07 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1115.
208 For an examination of the unequal treatment of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
sovereignty in the United States, see J.W. Singer, "Sovereignty and Property" (1991) 86 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1.
209 See Calder, supra note 200.
210 Ibid. at 405.
211 Ibid.
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Wet'suwet'en land by a treaty or conquest. Therefore, this doctrine
would have no application in examining assertions of Crown sovereignty
because the courts would not be reviewing or enforcing a treaty between
two sovereign states, nor would they be reviewing a grant of title from a
previously conquered sovereign. 212 As such, the courts would be
permitted to review the effects of the Crown assertion of sovereignty
over non-treaty Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia.
In fact, overseeing the proper conduct of other branches of
government is required of the courts as independent institutions, and of
the judiciary as formed of individuals within these institutions. 213 Judicial
independence has been guaranteed for centuries and is a cornerstone of
English and Canadian constitutionalism. 214 Canadian courts are separate
and autonomous from the Crown and the legislature; they do not
function as the servants of the Queen or Parliament. They administer
the rule of law, which is "superior and antecedent not only to legislation
and judicial decisions but also to the written constitution." 215 The British
Columbia Court of Appeal noted in BCGEU v. British Columbia
(A.G.)216 that judicial independence in England was won with the
passage of legislation in 1701217 that gave tenure to judges. This Act was
212 Some might contend, however, that the Act of State doctrine should be extended to
prevent the Court from reviewing the very assertion of Crown sovereignty. This may be appropriate
on the ground that such review (despite not being an issue of treaty of conquest) would nevertheless
be a challenge to an Act of State. In support, they may cite the doctrine, cited in Calder, supra note
200 at 406, which is a "recognition of the Sovereign prerogative to acquire territory in a way that
cannot be later challenged in a municipal Court." For those who make this argument, it should be
remembered that the history of parliamentary democracy's development is its attempt to restrict
and constrain the Crown's prerogative powers: see C. Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714
(New York: Norton, 1980) at 34-74, 119-44, 222-41, 275-90. The extension of the Crown's
prerogative to mere "assertions" may be a dangerous precedent that undermines the hard fought
struggles to bridle Crown power.
213 For commentary on the differences between institutional and individual independence of
the judiciary, see the observations of R.J. Scott, "Accountability and Independence" (1996) 45
U.N.B.L.J. 27.
214 See R. v. Lippi, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at 139: "[J]udicial independence is critical to the
public's perception of impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary prerequisite, for
judicial impartiality."
215 L. Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice and Interpretation (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1997) at 3.
216 (1985), 20 D.LR. (4th) 399 at 401 [hereinafter BcGEU]. Judicial independence also applies
in Canada, as the Court noted at 402: "In inheriting a constitution similar in principle to that of the
United Kingdom we have also inherited the fundamental precept that the courts represent a
separate and independent branch of government."
217 SeeAn Act for thefurther Limitation of the Crown and better securing the Rights and Liberties
of the Subject, 1700 & 1701 (U.K.), 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2.
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preceded by centuries of struggle with the executive and legislative
branches of government. As Sir William Holdsworth, the distinguished
British legal historian, has said:
The judiciary has separate and autonomous powers just as truly as the King or
Parliament; and in the exercise of these powers, its members are not more in the position
of servants than the King or Parliament in the exercise of their powers. ... The judges
have powers of this nature because, being entrusted with the maintenance of the
Supremacy of law, they are and long have been regarded as a separate and independent
part of the constitution.
2 18
Judicial independence and the supremacy of law ensures that courts are
free to question the actions of the other branches of government, if the
law requires it, when an action is brought before them.219 Presumably,
the courts would be permitted to scrutinize Crown assertions of
sovereignty and find them invalid if such proclamations did not comply
with the rule of law.220 As an independent body, a court would not be
barred from finding that the laws of Canada and British Columbia
relating to Aboriginal lands and governance are beyond the reach of the
Crown or Parliament if they do not comply with the rule of law, as
expressed in the Constitution's principles or provisions.221 To be more
specific, if the court found that the Crown did not comply with the law in
gaining underlying title and overriding sovereignty in British Columbia,
218 Cited in ncoEu, supra note 216 at 401.
219 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter Quebec Secession
Reference] at 258:
Simply put, the constitutionalism principle requires that all government action comply
with the Constitution. The rule of law principle requires that all government action must
comply with the law, including the Constitution. This Court has noted on several
occasions that with the adoption of the Charter, the Canadian system of government was
transformed to a significant extent from a system of Parliamentary supremacy to one of
constitutional supremacy.
220 It may be asked why the Court should even have this power as an alien political body on
Aboriginal land. One answer to this question is that, in this case, Aboriginal peoples voluntarily
brought their action to the Court and thereby vested this authority in them when they asked it to
scrutinize such issues. As such, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to be a Court of law (not
politics), to equally examine principles of law from Canadian and Gitksan/Wet'suwet'en societies,
and to deliver a judgment based on these criteria.
221 See Reference Re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of
Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 72L [hereinafter Manitoba Language Reference]. For an
excellent article examining the distinctions between constitutional principles and provisions in the
rule of law, see P. Monahan, "Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of
Law as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411. For an
alternative argument regarding the importance of the distinction between constitutional principles
and provisions, see J.C. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, "Submission to the Standing Senate Committee
on Legal and Constitution Affairs Concerning Bill C-22" [unpublished, on file with author].
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it would have to hold that such assertions were "of no legal force or
effect."222
Readers may question whether individual judges would ever
declare invalid the assertion of Crown sovereignty in British Columbia,
despite being a legal, institutional possibility. Because of what is at stake
in such a declaration, there would be an enormous temptation to do
everything possible to avoid such an outcome. After all, it may be asked,
who would respect the law and the judiciary if they arrived at this
conclusion? Too many people may suffer. Not knowing the law or
history, most would consider such a decision unreasonable, impractical,
unrealistic, and unsound. Since very few people would probably
understand the courts if they arrived at such a decision, there may be
real concerns about whether such a declaration would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
Yet, doesn't this line of inquiry only look at the issue from one
side? Aboriginal peoples, and others who are puzzled by the wide effect
of Crown assertions, might develop a greater respect for the judiciary.
People who agree with the judiciary's invalidation of Crown title may
understand the troubling history of Crown/Aboriginal relations, and they
might see how suffering could be reduced through such a rule. These
people would likely consider the decision to be reasonable, practical,
realistic, and sensible. The decision may even enhance the reputation of
the administration of justice as the courts apply the law in accordance
with their highest principles. Therefore, despite the challenges a judge
may encounter in questioning assertions of Crown sovereignty, the
criteria that must be used to arrive at such a decision cannot be based on
a numeric tally of public opinion.223 The judiciary is independent.
Conclusions must be legally expressed. It is not appropriate for judges to
use their power in any other way. While most judges would no doubt
struggle with such a ruling, if they were led to such a conclusion (because
they found in law that the effects of assertions of Crown sovereignty on
Aboriginal peoples legally "did not make sense") and they did not
express it, the very integrity of the Canadian legal fabric would be
undermined. 224 If the judiciary is to take the Constitution, the rule of
222 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 221 at 753.
223 As the Supreme Court said in the Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 260:
"Canadians have never accepted that ours is a system of simple majority rule."
224 Adjudication by neutral judges is considered to be the most important benefit of
civilization: see J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (New York: Macmillan, 1980) at 9-10.
However, for a discussion of how a judge may never be compelled to arrive at a certain result
because of the interpretive nature of lav and the value-laden character of the judicial role, see D.
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law, and their own office seriously, judicial independence mandates
"impartial and disinterested umpires."225 As such, any judge reviewing
the assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples would be expected
to do so in an impartial manner,226 without bias or predisposition to the
result.2 27 The fair and equitable application of law demands strict
adherence to this standard.228
Kennedy, "Toward a Critical Phenomenolog, of Judging" in A.C. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, eds.,
The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 141.
225 W.R. Lederman, "Judicial Independence and Court Reform in Canada for the 1990's"
(1987) 12 Queen's L.J. 385 at 397, n. 25.
226 See M.L. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada
(Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995) at 1, where Lamer C.J.C. observed:
The rule of law, interpreted and applied by impartial judges, is the guarantee of
everyone's rights and freedoms.... Judicial independence is, at its root, concerned with
impartiality, in appearance and in fact. And these, of course, are elements essential to an
effective judiciary. Independence is not a perk of judicial office. It is a guarantee of the
institutional conditions of impartiality.
For further discussions of impartiality and judicial independence, see also Valente v. R., [1985] 2
S.C.R. 673 at 685; R. v. Gintreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at 283; R. v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at
69; Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 at 552 (1994), cited with approval in R.D.S., supra note 108 at 528;
and R.F. Devlin, "We Can't Go On Together With Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized
Perspective in R. v. R.D.S." (1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 408.
22 7 In R.D.S., supra note 108 at 529, Cory J. cited with approval R. v. Bertram, [1989] O.J. No.
2123 (H.C.J.), online: QL (OJ):
In common usage bias describes a leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition towards one
side or another or a particular result. In its application to legal proceedings, it represents
a predisposition to decide an issue or cause in a certain way which does not leave the
judicial mind perfectly open to conviction. Bias is a condition or state of mind which
sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable to exercise his or her functions
impartially in a particular case.
228 This idea is illustrated in the fictive exchange between Sir Thomas More and William
Roper in Sir Thomas More's play, "A Man For All Seasons" in R. Bolt, A Man For All Seasons: A
Play of Sir Thomas More (Toronto: Irwin, 1963) at 39:
More: ... What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: Oh? ... And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on
you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? ... This country's planted
thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them
down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really think you could stand upright in the
winds that would blow then? ... Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's
sake.
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2. Violations of the rule of law
Aristotle observed that "[r]ightly constituted laws should be the
final sovereign" 229 in any just political community. He argued that the
rule of law (dikaiosyne) is preferable to personal rule because law better
distributes and combines moral virtue and important legal customs to
make the members of a state just and good (nomos). The sovereignty of
law could be threatened if "the law itself [had] a bias in favour of one
class or another" or if the laws were "in accordance with wrong or
perverted constitutions."230 Does the Court's reasoning in Delgamuukw
threaten the sovereignty of law? Failure to question the Crown's
assertions (while strictly scrutinizing Aboriginal assertions) appears to
create a bias in the law in favour of non-Aboriginal groups who rely on
Crown assertions in Canada. The Court's failure to interrogate Crown
sovereignty also potentially perverts Canada's Constitution. The
Constitution Act, 1982 proclaims that "Canada is founded upon
principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."231
Moreover, section 52(1) states that the Constitution is "the supreme law
of Canada." Did the Court in Delgamuukw respect the supremacy of the
rule of law in the Constitution? In the Manitoba Language Reference, the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized the supremacy of law over the
government when it wrote:
The rule of law, a fundamental principle of our Constitution, must mean at least two
things. First, that the law is supreme over officials of the government as well as private
individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power. Indeed, it is
because of the supremacy of law over the government, as established in ... s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, that this Court must find the unconstitutional laws of Manitoba to
be invalid and of no force or effect.2 3 2
229 E. Barker, ed., The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) at 127
[translated by author].
230 Ibid. Throughout Delgamuukw, the Court reveals an internal conflict as it vests final
sovereignty in both the Crown and the rule of law. This conflict threatens the sovereignty of law in
Canada. The vesting of final sovereignty in the Crown may produce a bias in the law in favour of
Canada's non-Aboriginal population, which traces its rights to the Crown. Aboriginal peoples do
not find their rights rooted in assertions of Crown sovereignty and thus could experience great
difficulties in having their entitlements placed on an equal footing with those derived from the
Crown. Furthermore, vesting final sovereignty in the Crown may pervert the Constitution and its
expression regarding the rule of law, in which final sovereignty is placed.
231 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 38, Preamble.
23 2 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 221 at 748-49.
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The Supreme Court of Canada's holding that the first principle of the
rule of law is to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power is significant.
This article has illustrated that the Crown's assertion of sovereignty,
depriving Aboriginal peoples of underlying title and overriding self-
government, is a blunt exercise of arbitrary power. It is arbitrary in the
sense that, in British Columbia, it has been exercised at the sole
discretion of non-Aboriginal governments without the participation or
agreement of the land's original inhabitants, and it has resulted in the
virtual devastation of their territories and communities. 233
What could be more arbitrary than one nation substantially
invalidating a politically distinct peoples' rights merely because that
nation says it is so, all without an elementally persuasive legal
explanation? Such an approach only assumes what it attempts to prove.
The Crown's assertion of sovereignty diminishing Aboriginal
entitlements is therefore also arbitrary in the sense that, at its core, it has
been done without coherent reasons. The Court has not articulated how
(and by what legal right) assertions of Crown sovereignty grant
underlying title to the Crown or displace Aboriginal governance. The
Crown's claim (upon the assertion of sovereignty) to possess lands that
are not their own is wholly unsubstantiated by the physical reality at the
time of their arrival. These "vague" and "unintelligible" propositions "do
not make sense" under the rule of law because they are merely a raw act
of arbitrary government expression. 234 As one author states, "[t]he very
essence of arbitrariness is to have one's status redefined by the state
without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing s0."235 As a
result, the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples in
British Columbia violates the first principle of the rule of law and is
unconstitutional.
The assertion of Crown sovereignty, and an accompanying denial
of Aboriginal rights to self-government, also violates the second
233 For example, the non-recognition of Aboriginal title; the creation of small, inadequate
reserves; ihe denial of the vote; the passage of anti-potlach laws; the denial of the right to pre-empt
land, the replacement of systems of government through the Indian Act; the outlawing of land
claims support; the horror of residential schools; and numerous other actions taken as a result of
the Crown's assertion of sovereignty.
234 To understand how vagueness and unintelligibility relate to the rule of law, see R. v. Nova
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at 643: "A law will be found unconstitutionally
vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate." How does
"crystallization" of Aboriginal title, which only assumes what the Crown aims to prove, provide
sufficient guidance for legal debate on title?
235 R.L. Rabin, "Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion
Through a Reasons Requirement" (1976) 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60 at 77-78.
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principle of the rule of law, which the Supreme Court described in the
following terms:
Second, the rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of
positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative
order. Law and order are indispensable elements of civilized life. ... As John Locke once
said, "A government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics, inconceivable to
human capacity and inconsistent with human society" ... According to Wade and Phillips,
ConstitutionalAdministrative Law (9th ed. 1977), at p. 89: "... the rule of law expresses a
preference for law and order within a community rather than anarchy, warfare and
constant strife. In this sense, the rule of law is a philosophical view of society which in the
Western tradition is linked with basic democratic notions."
23 6
Failure to recognize that Aboriginal governments in British Columbia
have maintained an actual order of positive and customary laws, which
preserves and embodies general principles of their ancient normative
structures, has lead to near anarchy and constant strife within these
communities. One only has to be passingly familiar with the
encumbrances on Aboriginal governments to appreciate this fact.
Aboriginal communities have suffered greatly because their
governments have been oppressed. 237 The Crown's suppression of
Aboriginal governance denies these groups indispensable elements of
law and order. It displaces Aboriginal peoples' "purposive ordering of
social relations providing a basis upon which an actual [contemporary,
culturally appropriate and effective] order of positive laws can be
brought into existence." 23 8 How there is any justification for such
repression in the circumstances this article has described "is a mystery in
politics, inconceivable to human capacity and inconsistent with human
society." The denial of Aboriginal powers of governance is therefore
236 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 221 at 749.
237 For a landmark report describing the encumbrances Aboriginal governments function
within, see K. Penner, Indiahi Self-Government in Canada: Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1983). Other accessible descriptions include H. Adams, Prison of Grass: Canada
from a Native Point of View (Toronto: General, 1975); H. Cardinal, The Unjust Society: The Tragedy
of Canada's Indians (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969); J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A
History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); B.
Richardson, ed., Drum Bea''Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill, 1989); B.
Richardson, People of Terra Nullius: Betrayal and Rebirth in Aboriginal Canada (Vancouver: Douglas
& McIntyre, 1993); and S.M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968-70
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
238 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 221 at 750-51. For examples of how the Canadian
government acted contrary to the rule of law in displacing Aboriginal peoples' own purposive
ordering of their own laws and social relations, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) (Co-chairs: R. Dussault &
G. Erasmus) at 137-200, 245-604.
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contrary to the second principle of the rule of law because it destroys
orderliness within Aboriginal communities.
However, despite the disorder imposed on Aboriginal peoples by
the assertion of Crown sovereignty, some would argue that the second
principle of the rule of law must also consider the "chaos and anarchy"
that would result if the Crown's assertion was held to be invalid and of
no legal force and effect. The Court would not tolerate a legal
vacuum, 239 nor would it tolerate a province being without a valid and
effectual legal system.240 Since the Constitution would not suffer a
province without laws, the Constitution would require that temporary
validity, force, and effect be given to those rights, obligations, and other
effects that have arisen under those laws until such time as the problem
leading to the invalidity could be corrected.2 41 In other words, despite
the invalidity of British Columbia laws (because their arbitrary, non-legal
foundation violates the first principle of the rule of law) the second
principle of the rule of law would require (1) that Aboriginal normative
orders be facilitated by recognizing Aboriginal powers of governance,
and (2) that the province's laws continue in effect until the parties
correct the invalidity by grounding Crown title and sovereignty on a
sound, substantiated legal foundation. Therefore, the next time the
Court considers Aboriginal self-government in British Columbia, the
second principle of the rule of law would require a recognition of
Aboriginal self-government to enable communities to maintain and
create law and order. It would further require that the Court declare
British Columbia's invalid laws operative until they could be fixed by the
federal Crown, working with First Nations, to place Crown sovereignty
in a workable, but proper, legal network. 242
239 See Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 221 at 753.
240 Ibid. at 757.
241 Ibid. at 768, where this rule was expressed as follows:
All rights, obligations and any other effects which have arisen under Acts of the
Manitoba Legislature which are purportedly repealed, spent, or would currently be in
force were it not for their constitutional defect, and which are not saved by the de facto
doctrine, or doctrines such as resjudicata and mistake of law, are deemed temporarily to
have been, and to continue to be, enforceable and beyond challenge from the date of
their creation to the expiry of the minimum period of time necessary for translation, re-
enactment, printing and publishing of these laws. At the termination of the minimum
period these rights, obligations and other effects will cease to have force and effect unless
the Acts under which they arose have been translated, re-enacted, printed and published
in both languages [emphasis in original].
242 In order to enjoy the rule of law, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples must live by
legal frameworks that are extensions of themselves. A review of Canada's law and history reveals
that Aboriginal peoples have not enjoyed this recognition. Is this a form of despotism? Aboriginal
[VOL. 37 No. 3
1999] Sovereignty's Alchemy
E. Extinguishment ofAboriginal Rights
As each section of this article has illustrated, the creation of
British Columbia was based on a unilateral declaration of sovereignty by
the Crown.243 Aboriginal peoples had their own governments and laws,
and the Crown purported to arbitrarily change these pre-existing orders
by granting themselves power to extinguish or infringe these ancient
institutions. In Sparrow,244 the Court held that prior to the enactment of
the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal government could extinguish
Aboriginal rights without the consent of a group claiming the right.245
The final section of Delgamuukw confirmed this power.246 In
Delgamuukw, the Court noted that section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 vests the federal government with the exclusive power to legislate
in relation to "Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians."247 This power
was interpreted as "encompass[ing] within it the exclusive power to
extinguish aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title."248 The Court
and non-Aboriginal peoples must be permitted to create structures that recognize the importance of
both Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty in Canada. People will find greater dignity in laws that
facilitate this objective. See C. Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995) at 187, where he writes:
In a despotism ... the requisite disciplines are maintained by coercion. In order to have a
free society, one has to replace this coercion with something else. This can only be a
willing identification with the polis on the part of the citizens, a sense that the political
institutions in which they live are an expression of themselves. The "laws" have to be seen
as reflecting and entrenching their dignity as citizens, and hence to be in a sense
extensions of themselves. This understanding that the political institutions are a common
bulwark of citizen dignity is the basis of what Montesquieu called "vertu" ... . But it is
quite unlike the apolitical attachment to universal principle that the stoics advocated or
that is central to modern ethics of rule by law.
See the Nisga'a treaty for one possible model in creating this proper legal framework.
243 It was unilateral in the sense that Aboriginal peoples did not participate in its creation,
and their political will in the matter was actively suppressed. For a discussion of the implications of
unilateral assertions of sovereignty, see Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 264-66.
2 4 4 Supra note 54.
245 The Court noted in Sparrow, ibid. at 1099, that "[t]he consent to its extinguishment before
the Constitution Act, 1982, was not required ... The test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our
opinion, is that the Sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal
right." The Court has also suggested that, prior to 1982, negotiated treaty rights can be unilaterally
modified without the consent of the Aboriginal group that claims the protection of the treaty: see R.
v. Badger, [199611 S.C.R. 771.
246 In Delgamiuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1115, the Court noted that "[r]ights which were
extinguished by the sovereign before that time are not revived by [section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982]."
247 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5.
248 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1116.
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arrived at its conclusion without ever questioning whether
extinguishment was "a morally and politically defensible conception of
aboriginal rights." 249 It simply assumed that "[i]n a federal system such
as Canada's, the need to determine whether aboriginal rights have been
extinguished raises the question of which level of government has
jurisdiction to do so."25o The question of extinguishment is kept within
the bounds of Crown sovereignty by only examining the interplay
between federal and provincial powers in the Constitution.251 In framing
extinguishment in terms of a "need," the Court implies that it deems the
subordination of pre-existing governments as necessary to the
construction of Canadian federalism. There is no critical examination of
whether it is lawful, in the first place, for one nation to extinguish
another's rights without their democratic participation or consent,
merely through a distant assertion of sovereignty. The Court's
formulation of this doctrine seemingly prevents questioning the
legitimacy of acts that extinguished Aboriginal rights following the
Crown's assertion of sovereignty before 1982.
The limited scope of the Court's inquiry is illustrated in the three
questions it addresses concerning extinguishment. The questions are (1)
whether the province had the jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights
between 1871 and 1982;252 (2) if the province was without jurisdiction in
this period, whether it could extinguish title through laws of general
application; and (3) whether aprovincial law, which could not otherwise
extinguish Aboriginal rights, might be given that power through
referential incorporation. The Court only looked at the province's role
in extinguishment and answered each of these questions in the negative
by holding that the provincial level of government had no power to
extinguish Aboriginal rights. Nowhere did the Court explicitly comment
249 Van der Peet, supra note 56 at 547, citing Walters, supra note 15 at 413.
25 0 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1115.
251 The submergence of Aboriginal jurisdiction within federal/provincial disputes is also found
in other areas of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence: see M.E. Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991) 10 Can. J.
Fam. L 17.
252 The Court expressed no opinion concerning extinguishment of Aboriginal title in British
Columbia prior to 1871. Since there were numerous proclamations and ordinances prior to 1871 in
this area (which some courts have interpreted as extinguishing Aboriginal title in British Columbia),
the Court's failure to address this question leaves a very wide door open for those who would claim
that Aboriginal title in the province was extinguished before British Columbia entered
Confederation.
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on the participation and rights of Aboriginal peoples in this matter.253
Such a comment would have been more consistent with Aboriginal
peoples' status as original occupants of the land, and more in harmony
with the idea that it is they who would have to consent to any alteration
of their legal status.254 For example, in addressing the first question, the
Court held that the province could not establish jurisdiction to
extinguish Aboriginal title because section 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867 only gave British Columbia ownership of lands that belonged to
them at the time of union in 1871. The Court stated that "[a]lthough that
provision [section 109] vests underlying title in provincial Crowns, it
qualifies provincial ownership by making it subject to the 'any interest
other than that of the Province in the same." 255 Therefore, since
Aboriginal title lands are "any Interest other than that of the Province in
the same," the province cannot extinguish title to these lands because
section 91(24) gives the federal government jurisdiction over this
interest.256 In addressing the second question, the Court held that the
province could not establish jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title
through laws of general application because "provincial laws which
single out Indians for special treatment are ultra vires, because they are
in relation to Indians and therefore invade federal jurisdiction." 257
253 The Supreme Court of Canada recently determined that band councils could grant long-
term interests in reserve land, without extinguishing their rights in the parcel. In Opetchesaht Indian
Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119 at 146, the Court found that under section 28(2) of the Indian
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, bands have the authority to "grant limited indeterminate rights in reserve
lands" without securing the consent of their membership.
254 For a case that demonstrates the role of Aboriginal consent in the alternation of their legal
interests, see Semiahmoo Indian Band v. R., [1998] 1 F.C. 3 (C.A.) [hereinafter Semiahmoo]. The
Court's attention was focused on the Crown's fiduciary obligations that attached to surrenders of
lands under sections 37 and 38 of the Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29. In Semiahmoo, ibid. at 28, the
Court found that the Crown had a "post-surrender" fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
band, and that it had violated this duty when it failed to return land to the band when it requested it
at a later date. Semiahmoo is significant because it demonstrates some courts' concerns regarding
the Crown's treatment of Indian consent. For commentary, see B. Freedman, "Semiahmoo Indian
Band v. Canada" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 218. See also E. Meehan & E. Stewart, "Developments in
Aboriginal Law: The 1995-96 Term" (1997) 8 Supreme Court L.R. 1 at 4 (commenting on Bluebeny
River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4
S.C.R. 344).
255 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1117.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid. at 1119. The Court continued, at 1120-21: "As a result, a provincial law could never,
proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal rights, because the intention to do so would take the law
outside provincial jurisdiction." For further commentary on the jurisdictional implications of
Delgamukiv, see N. Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource
Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317.
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Finally, in addressing the third question concerning extinguishment, the
Court held that the province could not extinguish Aboriginal title
through referential incorporation because section 88 of the Indian Act,
which allows referential incorporation in some cases, "does not evince
the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish aboriginal rights."25 8
One can see in this treatment the narrow bounds within which the
Court's discussion of extinguishment occurs. While the Court in this case
finds that the provinces cannot exercise powers of extinguishment over
Aboriginal title, this result does not mean that the Crown's assertion of
sovereignty cannot dispossess Aboriginal peoples of their ancient rights.
This is still possible, as long as it is done by the proper manifestation of
the Crown, which, in this instance, is the federal government. 259
These wide powers of extinguishment illustrate the problem of
unimpeded assertions of Crown sovereignty for Aboriginal peoples in
British Columbia. This power "risks undermining the very purpose of s.
35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal
peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive
cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies." 260 When an alien
government gives itself the exclusive authority to extinguish the distinct
rights of another people, without their consent, one wonders how this
can be constitutionally justified. Such a result must be congruent with
broader constitutional principles. In the Quebec Secession Reference, the
Supreme Court of Canada identified some of these principles. It
observed that in the Canadian "constitutional tradition, legality and
legitimacy are linked." 26' Any consideration of the extinguishment of
258 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note I at 1122.
259 The cases of Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1997), 153 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (B.C. C.A.) [hereinafter Haida]; Halfivay River First Nation v. British Cotumbia (Ministry of
Forests) (1998), 39 B.C.L.R. (3d) 227 (B.C. S.C.); and R. v. Paul (T.P.) (1998), 196 N.B.R. (2d) 292
(C.A.) demonstrate that Aboriginal peoples' interest in their lands can affect the province's use and
management of that resource. For instance, in Haida, the Haida claimed Aboriginal title to a large
area subject to a tree farm license. The issue was whether the Haida's claim was capable of
constituting an encumbrance within the meaning of section 28 of the Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
157. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Haida, ibid. at 5, that there was "no reason to
doubt that, as a matter of plain or grammatical meaning, the aboriginal title claimed by the Haida
Nation, if it exists, constitutes an encumbrance on the Crown's title to the timber." This case,
coupled with Delgamuulkv, demonstrates the significant impact that Aboriginal title could have on
the use and management of provincial Crown lands.
260 C6t, supra note 39 at 175. The Court cites Brennan J. in Mabo, supra note 59 at 42:
"Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights and interests
in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of
that kind can no longer be accepted."
261 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 240.
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Aboriginal rights should therefore review these broader principles to
assess the legality and legitimacy of the Crown's assertion of sovereignty
in British Columbia. The need for this wide examination is suggested by
the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights in the Constitution. As the
Supreme Court observed in Sparrow, "[s]ection 35 calls for a just
settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules of the game
under which the Crown established courts of law and denied those
courts the authority to question sovereign claims made by the Crown." 262
1. Constitutional precepts
When courts exercise the authority given to them to question
sovereign claims made by the Crown, their review must look to an oral
tradition, "[b]ehind the written word," which is "an historical lineage
stretching back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the
underlying constitutional principles." 263 The legality and legitimacy of
extinguishment depend on these oral "fundamental and organizing
principles," 264 which "are the vital unstated assumptions upon which the
text is based."265 These precepts informing the constitutional text are (1)
federalism; (2) democracy; (3) constitutionalism and the rule of law; and
(4) respect for minorities.2 66 As "underlying constitutional principles"
they "may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive legal
obligations ... which constitute substantive limitations upon government
action." 267 The question for this section of the article is what these four
constitutional principles would sustain, when considered together,
268
relative to the legality and legitimacy of the extinguishment of
Aboriginal rights prior to 1982. A brief examination of each doctrine
reveals that Aboriginal peoples should be able to interrogate the
262 Sparrow, supra note 54 at 1106, citing N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional
Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95 at 100.
263 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 247.
264 Ibid. at 240.
265 Ibid. at 247.
266 ibid. at 240.
267 Ibid. at 249.
268 See ibid. at 248, where the Court wrote: "These defining principles function in symbiosis.
No single principle can be defined in isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or
exclude the operation of any other."
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implication that the Crown's assertion of sovereignty allows for the
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights.
In discussing the first constitutional principle in the Quebec
Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote that the federal
system is only partially complete "according to the precise terms of the
Constitution Act, 1867"269 because the "federal government retained
sweeping powers which threatened to undermine the autonomy of the
provinces."270 Since "the written provisions of the Constitution [do] not
provide the entire picture" 27) of the Canadian federal structure, the
Supreme Court observed that the courts have had to "control the limits
of the respective sovereignties." 272 They have also had to facilitate
"democratic participation by distributing power to the government
thought to be most suited to achieving the particular societal objective,"
having regard to the diversity of the component parts of
Confederation 2 73 This approach has resulted in shared political power
in Canada between two orders of government-the provinces and the
central government. Provincial power has been significantly
strengthened under this interpretation. Applying these principles, would
it not be possible to also regard the federal system as only partially
complete with regards to Aboriginal peoples? 274 Could it not be similarly
argued that the "federal government retained sweeping powers" relative
to Aboriginal peoples that "threatened to undermine the autonomy" of
these groups? Furthermore, since the "written provisions of the
Constitution does not provide the entire picture" in relation to
Aboriginal peoples, could not the courts also "control the limits of the
respective sovereignties" by distributing power to the Aboriginal
government "thought to be most suited to achieving [a] particular
societal objective"? If the courts can draw on unwritten principles of
federalism to fill in "'gaps in the express terms of the constitutional
text' 275 in order to strengthen provincial powers, why can they not do
269 Ibid. at 250.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid., citing Northern Telecom Canada Ltd. v. Communication Workers of Canada, [1983] 1
S.C.R. 733 at 741.
273 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 251.
274 See B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism:
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 309.
275 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 249, citing Reference Re Remuneration of
Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 75.
590 [VOL. 37 No. 3
Sovereignty's Alchemy
the same to facilitate "the pursuit of collective goals by cultural and
linguistic minorities" 276 that comprise Aboriginal nations? Following the
Court's reasoning, the principle of federalism could be applied to
question assertions of sovereignty that purportedly extinguished
Aboriginal powers to function as an equal, integral part of the federal
structure in Canada.
The next principle the courts could consider in assessing the
legality and legitimacy of the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights prior
to 1982 is democracy. In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme
Court held that "democracy has always informed the design of our
constitutional structure, and continues to act as an essential interpretive
consideration to this day. ... [It] can best be understood as a sort of
baseline against which the framers of our Constitution, and
subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always
operated." 277 The notion of democracy to which the Court referred278
includes the ideas of majority rule; the promotion of self-government;
the accommodation of cultural and group identities; the popular
franchise; and the consent of the governed. Does a unilateral
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, and a subsequent denial of a legal
right to question this action, advance majority rule? (Aboriginal peoples
were in the majority in British Columbia at the time rights could
purportedly be extinguished.) Does it promote community self-
government and accommodate aboriginal identities? (Aboriginal
governments were overlaid by elected Indian Act governments, and
individuals were subjected to ruthless assimilation policies.) Finally, does
unilateral extinguishment secure the consent of the governed?
(Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia have consistently resisted the
extinguishment of their rights.) By applying these democratic notions,
one may question whether the assertion of Crown sovereignty was a
legally valid, or a legitimately effective, exercise of power such that it
extinguished Aboriginal rights. Keeping this question in mind, one might
consider the Court's observation:
It is the law that creates the framework within which the "sovereign will" is to be
ascertained and implemented. To be accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions must
rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. That is, they must allow for the participation of,
and accountability to, the people, through public institutions created under the
Constitution. Equally, however, a system of government cannot survive through
adherence to the law alone. A political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our
276 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 252.
277 ibid. at 253.
278 Ibid. at 253-56.
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political culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of law and the democratic
principle. The system must be capable of reflecting the aspirations of the people. But
there is more. Our law's claim to legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, many
of which are imbedded in our constitutional structure.
279
The Court here suggests that the Canadian Constitution must create a
"framework" for, and a "legal foundation" upon which the sovereign will
can be ascertained relative to Aboriginal groups' participation in federal
structures. Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia have never had an
opportunity to participate as traditional governments in the federal
structure. They have not been a part of this "framework." Legally, this
exclusion is most profound when it includes extinguishment. Morally,
this exclusion is most repugnant when the assumption of extinguishment
carries with it the germs of forced integration, assimilation, and cultural
genocide. For many Aboriginal peoples, extinguishment is genocide.280
This is not a morally legitimate framework to embed in our
constitutional structure; the principle of democracy cannot sanction such
treatment.
The rule of law should also be placed beside federalism and
democracy when considering the extinguishment of Aboriginal title. The
Court observed that "[a]t its most basic level, the rule of law vouchsafes
to the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and
ordered society in which to conduct their affairs." 281 Extinguishment
does not ensure this type of a society because it severely disrupts
Aboriginal nations and causes deeply rooted resentment against the
federal government. This resentment is translated into strained,
adversarial relations, periodic blockades, and endless litigation, which
leads to instability within the larger population. The consequences of
this resentment could lead to dissension and violence if left unattended.
While this state of affairs should be condemned in the strongest possible
terms, if ever we arrive at this point, the doctrine of extinguishment
279 Ibid.
280 George Watts, chairman of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nation on Vancouver Island said the
following in F. Cassidy, ed., Reaching Just Settlements: Land Claims in British Columbia (Lantzville,
B.C.: Oolichan Books & The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991) at 22:
There is this term being tossed around about aboriginal title. Well, I even disagree with
that term. ... What we have in our area is a name called Ha Houlthee, which is not
aboriginal title. Ha Houlthee is very different from the legal term of aboriginal title. And
you can't extinguish my title because it comes from my chief. You have to destroy us as a
people if you want to extinguish our title. That is the only possible way to extinguish our
title, to get rid of us as a people.
281 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 257.
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could be considered one of its background causes because it represents a
failure to fully extend the rule of law to Aboriginal peoples.
The failure of the Crown to protect Aboriginal peoples from the
unilateral extinguishment of their rights prior to 1982 has failed them in
at least three profound ways. First, there have been few safeguards for
the fundamental human rights and individual freedoms of Aboriginal
peoples for most of their history. This has resulted in their individual
and collective lives being unduly "susceptible to government
interference." 28 2 Second, in the creation of the province, the parties did
not ensure that, as a vulnerable group, Aboriginal peoples were
"endowed with the institutions and rights necessary to maintain and
promote their identities against the assimilative pressures of the
majority." 28 3 This led to further vulnerability. Third, the political
organization of British Columbia in Canada did not "provide for a
division of political power"28 4 that prevented the provincial and federal
governments from usurping the powers of Aboriginal governments. As
such, non-Aboriginal governments usurped aboriginal authority "simply
by exercising its legislative power to allocate additional political power to
itself unilaterally."28 5 These transgressions of the rule of law illustrate
the problems of founding a province on the unilateral extinguishment of
Aboriginal title. It does not produce a stable, ordered, and predictable
society. The courts must avoid such a conclusion.
Finally, in considering the legality and legitimacy of
constitutional principles that relate to the extinguishment of Aboriginal
rights, it should be recalled that the Court in the Quebec Secession
Reference held that "the protection of minority rights is itself an
independent principle underlying our constitutional order."28 6
Aboriginal rights must not be extinguished through unilateral action on
the part of the Crown because this would fail to protect Aboriginal
peoples from the majority in Canada. The application of extinguishment
could also defeat the "promise" of section 35, which "recognized not
only the ancient occupation of land by aboriginal peoples, but their
contribution to the building of Canada, and the special commitments
made to them by successive governments." 28 7 Crown claims that they can




286 Ibid. at 261-62.
287 Ibid. at 262.
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extinguish Aboriginal rights on its authority alone does not seem
consistent with the Court's observation that "the protection of minority
rights was clearly an essential consideration in the design of our
constitutional structure .... "288 One wonders how Canadians would
respond if positions were reversed and Aboriginal peoples were vested
with the exclusive power to extinguish non-Aboriginal rights. The courts
must combine the principles of federalism, democracy, the rule of law,
and the protection of minorities to assess the legality and legitimacy of
the doctrine of extinguishment. Until this occurs, Aboriginal peoples will
continue to critique the unjust application of Canadian law to their
societies.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has illustrated that the Court's decision in
Delgamuukw is suffused with the Court's acceptance of a subsequent
claimant's nonconsensual assertion of rights over a prior owner's land.
The Court's ultimate sanction of colonization, subjugation, domination,
and exploitation of Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia, despite its
attempt to provide protections for Aboriginal peoples in this process, is
not a "morally and politically defensible conception of aboriginal
rights."289 It "perpetuat[es] historical injustice suffered by aboriginal
peoples at the hands of [the] colonizers," 290 and raises a claim of a legal
right to self-determination. As this article has argued, the Crown's
creation of British Columbia can only be regarded as the effectuation of
secession from the established political organizations in the area
"without prior negotiations" 291 involving the nations and tribes who lived
there. One might properly regard this act as placing Aboriginal peoples
under "colonial rule," which led to "subjugation, domination and
exploitation" and blocked their "meaningful exercise of self-
determination." 292 In commenting on the right of self-determination in
288 Ibid.
289 Van der Peet, supra note 56 at 547, citing Walters, supra note 15 at 413.
290 Ct6,supra note 39 at 175.
291 This language appears in the Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 264.
292 For the Supreme Court's discussion of similar issues in Quebec's claim of the right to
secede based on the principles of self-determination, see Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219
at 284-86. The exploitation and colonization of Aboriginal peoples occurred through, inter alia: the
imposition of band councils over hereditary governments; the criminalization of their social,
economic, and spiritual relations through the enactment of the laws against potlach; the
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the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court observed that it can
be claimed in three circumstances:
[Tihe international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to
external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed,
as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural
development. In all three situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to
external self-determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally
their right to self-determination.
2 93
Aboriginal peoples may have an argument for self-determination
on the authority of these principles if the Crown's assertion of
sovereignty is not tempered in ways suggested in this article. Otherwise,
Aboriginal peoples may be able to argue that they are colonial peoples,
"inherently distinct from the colonialist Power and the occupant Power
and that their 'territorial integrity,' all but destroyed by the colonialist or
occupying Power, should be fully restored."294 Furthermore, Aboriginal
peoples may be able to claim the legal right to self-determination by
arguing that Canada's extinguishment of their rights has not
promote[d] ... [the] realization of the principle[s] of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples ... bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of friendly relations], as well as a
denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the [Charter of the United
Nations].
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Finally, Aboriginal peoples may claim the right to self-
determination because the unilateral extinguishment of the rights prior
to 1982, and their continued "blocking" from questioning this injustice,
means the Canadian government does not represent "the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind."296 If
fragmentation of their territorial integrity through the denial and/or infringement of land rights and
the creation of small, inadequate reserves; the century-long denial of the right to vote in federal and
provincial elections; the traumatic removal of whole generations of children through residential
schools and insensitive child welfare laws; and the restricted access to their traditional food sources
through the imposition of discriminatory fishing and hunting licences.
293 Ibid. at 287.
294 Ibid. at 284-85, citing A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 334.
295 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 285, citing the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc.
A/8082 (1970) 121 at 123-24.
296 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 285, citing the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993),
A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) at 4 (1.2).
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Finally, Aboriginal peoples may claim the right to self-
determination because the unilateral extinguishment of the rights prior
to 1982, and their continued "blocking" from questioning this injustice,
means the Canadian government does not represent "the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind."296 If
Aboriginal peoples were able to show the force of any one of these
arguments and establish that they were entitled to the legal right of self-
determination, this could take them a great distance in undoing the
"spell" of Crown sovereignty under which they currently function. Each
party needs to more fully explore these issues and subsequently reconcile
them through joint effort.
The Court recognized this trajectory, and the necessity of placing
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations on a different plane, when it
concluded its judgment in Delgamuukw:
Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all
sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van
der Peet ... to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1)--"the reconciliation of the pre-existence of
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown." Let us face it, we are all here to
stay.29
7
While the Court's encouragement of negotiated settlements is promising
for the resolution of the issues identified in this article, its observation
that "we are all here to stay" does not tell us where "here" is. It is clear
that if "here" is principally defined in relation to a reconciliation with
magical assertions of Crown sovereignty, "here" will never be a place
where Aboriginal peoples will feel at home. With this caution as a
conclusion, it may be instructive to remember the 1884 statement of the
Gitksan chiefs from Gitwangak:
In making this claim, we would appeal to your sense of justice and right. We would
remind you that it is the duty of the Government to uphold the just claims of all
peaceable and law-abiding persons such as we have proved ourselves to be. We hold
these lands by the best of all titles. We have received them as a gift of the Creator to our
Grandmothers and Grandfathers, and we believe that we cannot be deprived of them by
anything short of direct injustice.298
296 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 219 at 285, citing the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993),
A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) at 4 (1.2).
29 7 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at 1124, citing Van derPeet, supra note 56 at 539.
298 Monet & Wilson, supra note 15 at 1.
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